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A B S T R A C T
Trusted computing is gaining an increasing acceptance in the
industry and finding its way to cloud computing. With this
penetration, the question arises whether the concept of hard-
wired security modules will cope with the increasing sophisti-
cation and security requirements of future IT systems and the
ever expanding threats and violations. So far, embedding cryp-
tographic hardware engines into the Trusted Platform Module
(TPM) has been regarded as a security feature. However, new
developments in cryptanalysis, side-channel analysis, and the
emergence of novel powerful computing systems, such as quan-
tum computers, can render this approach useless. Given that,
the question arises: Do we have to throw away all TPMs and
lose the data protected by them, if someday a cryptographic
engine on the TPM becomes insecure? To address this ques-
tion, we present a novel architecture called Sustainable Trusted
Platform Module (STPM), which guarantees a secure update of
the TPM cryptographic engines without compromising the sys-
tem’s trustworthiness. The STPM architecture has been imple-
mented as a proof-of-concept on top of a Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA
platform, demonstrating the test cases with an update of the
fundamental hash and asymmetric engines of the TPM.
Z U S A M M E N F A S S U N G
Trusted Computing erhält zunehmend Akzeptanz in der indus-
triellen Anwendung und findet auch seinen Weg in das Cloud
Computing. Mit dieser Durchdringung stellt sich Frage ob das
Konzept hardwarebasierter Sicherheitsmodule mit zunehmen-
dem Reifegrad und steigenden Sicherheitsanforderungen zukün-
ftiger IT-Systeme, sowie immer neuen Angriffsformen, noch
immer geeignet ist. Bisher wurden kryptografische Hardware-
maschinen in Trusted Platfrom Modulen (TPM) als Sicherheits-
feature betrachtet. Neue Entwicklungen in der Kryptoanalyse,
Side-Channel Analysen und die Entwicklung neuer Hochleis-
tungsrechner wie Quantencomputer lassen dies jedoch frag-
würdig erscheinen. Dabei stellt sich die folgende Frage: müssen
wir alle TPMs wegwerfen und dabei all jene Daten verlieren die
vii
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auf ihnen basieren, wenn sich eines Tages herausstellt, dass die
kryptografischen Maschinen dieser Module unsicher sind? Wir
behandeln diese Frage indem wir einen neuen Ansatz, Nach-
haltige Trusted Platfrom Module (STPM) genannt, präsentieren.
Dieser Ansatz erlaubt eine sichere Aktualisierung der kryp-
tografischen Maschine eines TPM ohne die Vertrauenswürdigkeit
des Systems zu kompromitieren. Die STPM Architektur wurde
prototypisch als proof-of-concept auf einer Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA
Plattform implementiert und demonstriert Testfälle für die Ak-
tualisierung der fundamentalen Hashfunktionen und asymmetrischen
Maschinen des TPM.
viii
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1
I N T R O D U C T I O N
The advances in Internet technology have led to connecting
more and more devices over a network and thus creating the
possibility of an easy interaction between them. On the flip side,
this interaction causes a compromised security and a loss of
data on a device by discovering and exploiting its vulnerabil-
ities. For example, one typical attack scenario in the area of
personal computing is the online-banking, where the attacker
may intercept the log-in details of the customer. Utilizing these
details, the attacker would perform transactions though he is
an unauthorized person. One such published work in this area
is the attack carried out by the chaos computer club on the
computer interface of the home banking system [10]. In case of
enterprises using servers, the attacks are on the sensitive data
such as company personnel, e-commerce, and others. This can
be seen from a possible attack described by Spalka et al. in
[84] against a certified signature application. Similarly in an
automotive embedded system, an attack could be to make ille-
gal changes to controllers within the system such as reducing
the odometer reading to increase the car value [96]. Though a
limited list of possible attack scenarios on different systems is
given above, there are many such real world applications which
are prone to regular attacks. Thus, there is a need to address
the issue of data theft to assure the users and the organisations
with the security of their personal data.
Information security is one such field that addresses the pro-
tection of individual data belonging to a certain device. The
core concept of information security is to provide the confiden-
tiality, integrity, and authenticity of the data, thereby avoiding
an unauthorized access to it.
According to National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), they are defined as follows:
• Confidentiality protects the secrecy of the data by encryp-
tion such that the data may not be intercepted by the at-
tacker. This is because the data being transferred on the
communication channel is no more available in a plain
text form but as a cipher.
1
[ July 18, 2013 at 11:31 ]
2 introduction
• Integrity of the data is checked at both transmitting and
receiving ends, is aimed at detecting any alteration of the
data during its transfer on the communication channel.
For this, the data being transferred is appended with its
hash value which would be compared with the computed
hash value at the receiver side. Thus, the hash values (di-
gests) of the message are utilized to protect the integrity
of the data.
• Authenticity ensures each entity at the end of the commu-
nication channel that it is talking to the right entity which
it is intended to. Digital signatures and message authenti-
cation codes are the mathematical schemes that prove the
authenticity of an entity.
Computer security is the specific branch of information se-
curity which provides various mechanisms, as illustrated be-
low, for securing sensitive data on a Personal Computer (PC).
The data on a computer may be protected by installing anti-
virus software on it or by setting up a firewall in case that the
computer is always connected to the Internet. The anti-virus
is utilized to prevent, detect, and remove any malware threats
such as computer viruses, computer worms, trojan horses, spy-
ware, and others. However, some of these anti-virus software
can reduce the computer’s performance because they consume
a lot of processing power. Whereas, a firewall may be software-
based (as in most of the current Operating Systems (OSs)) or
hardware-based (as in broadband routers) which protects the
computer against threats from public Internet and keeps the
network secured. Considering the case of protecting the data
on a computer (not in a network) the firewall would be the
software-based security solution included inside the OS. Fur-
thermore, it is possible to improve the computer security by re-
designing the operating systems or by changing programming
methodologies.
However, all the aforementioned techniques provide only a
software-based security to the user data, which is weaker than
any available hardware-based protection mechanism. This is be-
cause the software-based solutions always require a running OS
and which can easily be modified compared to hardware. This
has been confirmed from experience of security trends in the
smartcard world which applies equally to host systems such
as PC platforms. A smartcard has its own OS for communicat-
ing with a server via a card reader. The smartcard also has its
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1.1 trusted computing 3
own file system, in which the OS can protect files by means of
encryption, passwords or PIN codes. Although in the military
and government sector there have been some attempts to de-
velop purely software-based high-security systems, even there
the access to the appropriate hardware is greatly limited. This
leads to an additional disadvantage that the functionality and
flexibility of the OS is generally very restricted. Thus, to pro-
vide a comprehensive defense against the security threats and
to provide a trusted and tamper-proof security, more than one
form of security approach is required to be included in the sys-
tem.
In this context, changes to the design of hardware is one use-
ful method among many for improving security of the plat-
form. While hardware changes to a device are not a prereq-
uisite for increased security, they are undeniably helpful. For
example, adding an additional dedicated security module to
the motherboard of a PC could be one such hardware modifi-
cation. This dedicated security module may provide a way to
securely store the sensitive cryptographic data such as the pri-
vate keys of the user thereby defending the data protected by
those keys [7]. One such technology to enhance the security
of the PCs through hardware changes made to the underlying
architecture is the Trusted Computing (TC) [6]. The other initia-
tive is the Microsoft’s OS project, referred to as Next-Generation
Secure Computing Base (NGSCB) [3]. This project specifies soft-
ware changes that take advantage of the security benefits made
available by a planned new PC hardware design. The other less
well-known such projects are by processor vendors such as the
Trusted Execution Technology (TXT) from Intel [2] and the Se-
cure Execution Mode (SEM) from AMD [1]. These projects pro-
vide the hardware support for all the major features needed by
TC and NGSCB initiatives. However, in this thesis, only details
about the TC approach are given because it is utilized as the
standard technology specification for this work.
1.1 trusted computing
Trusted Computing has been developed and promoted by the
Trusted Computing Group (TCG) [6], which is an international
de facto standards body with a consortium of large number of
Information Technology (IT) enterprises and hardware manu-
facturers such as AMD, Intel, IBM, DELL, HP, Microsoft, and
others. Trusted Computing Group creates specifications and
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4 introduction
guidelines for developing hardware modules that can be used
to augment the security in end-user systems. These specifica-
tions define trusted modules for devices such as PCs and other
devices, trusted infrastructure requirements, as well as Applica-
tion Programming Interfaces (APIs) and protocols necessary to
operate a trusted environment. Further, without such standard
security procedures and shared specifications, it is not possible
for components of the trusted environment to inter-operate and
trusted computing applications cannot be implemented to work
on all platforms. Though a proprietary solution for building a
trusted environment may be possible, it cannot ensure global
interoperability and is not capable of providing a comparable
level of assurance due to more limited access to cryptographic
and security expertise and reduced availability for a rigorous
review process. Furthermore, from the point of view of cryp-
tography, for interoperability with the other elements of the
platform, other platforms, and infrastructure, it is necessary for
trusted modules to be able to use the same cryptographic al-
gorithms. Although standard published algorithms may have
weaknesses, these algorithms are thoroughly tested and are
gradually replaced or improved when vulnerabilities are dis-
covered which is not true in the case of proprietary algorithms.
In the above mentioned context, the standards published by the
TCG are utilized for building trusted platforms that incorporate
the TC technology. The concept of trusted computing has been
described in many publications ranging from the Orange Book
[74] through to more recent material that describe these ideas
within the context of contemporary developments in computer
security [45, 83].
According to TCG, “a trusted platform is the one which be-
haves in an expected manner for the intended purpose” [91].
This means that any entity that interacts with such a trusted
platform can be given some degree of assurance that the plat-
form (a system or a computer) will behave in the way that entity
expects it to. Providing assurance of expected behavior does not
in itself provide any security, instead to achieve that, the entity
relying on this assurance still has to ascertain that the expected
behavior is indeed secure. This assurance may be achieved by
utilizing remote attestation procedure, which is one of the main
features of the TC technology. However, assuming that the rely-
ing entity is satisfied that the expected behavior is secure then
the entity may be assured that any data given to the system
is kept confidential or that no malware is running on the plat-
[ July 18, 2013 at 11:31 ]
1.1 trusted computing 5
Applications Trusted Applications
Trusted Computing Platform
Services Trusted Services
Trusted Operating System
Trusted Component (TPM)
Figure 1.1: Trusted Computing Platform [30]
form. Though there are many ways to design trusted comput-
ing platforms that allow statements about expected behavior to
be made, the approach taken by the TCG is to have some phys-
ically secure trusted component, that can be used as a founda-
tion upon which trust in the rest of the system can be built.
Such a trusted component to provide this foundation of trust
is the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [8], which is specified by
the TCG. The TPM is implemented as a tamper-proof integrated
circuit and is affixed to the platform, usually on a printed cir-
cuit board (in specific motherboard) containing a more power-
ful processor (i.e., main processor) capable of running software
applications. Thus, the TPM can be used as the trust anchor for
higher level processes that run on the main processor.
A trusted computing platform [22] utilizing the TPM as the
trusted component is depicted in Figure 1.1. Such a platform de-
fines the services required for the implementation of the trusted
computing concept extensions to the hardware of the system.
This includes for example the use of new components on the
motherboard, the installation of expansion cards or the adap-
tation of existing components such as the Central Processing
Unit (CPU) or the chipset. These enhancements may include the
adaptation of the closely related software with the hardware
i.e., the firmware. The trusted operating system with its central
component as secure operating system kernel (trusted kernel),
provides the interface for trusted applications and trusted ser-
vices.
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Figure 1.2: Chain-of-Trust [30]
In contrast to achieving the platform security by means of
additional encryption or anti-virus software at a higher level,
the TCG approach begins at the lowest level of the platform.
The approach relies on the secure measurement of a certain
level in the boot process of a system before transferring the
execution control to the next level. Each level in the process,
called as an entity, cryptographically measures the next entity,
stores the measured value inside the registers of the hardware
module and then transfers the control to it. Further, a log en-
try containing the utilized register number, stored value, and
a log message is made. This process of measuring and passing
control creates a Chain-of-Trust (COT) [22], as depicted in Fig-
ure 1.2, because every predecessor entity in the chain must be
trusted before trusting the current entity. Now, an important
question arises, i.e., how to trust the first entity in the chain
or in other words who measures the first entity? For this, the
TCG says: “to build a trusted platform, the first and foremost
entity in the COT must always be trusted because its misbehav-
ior can not be detected”. This entity which is always trusted is
called as the trust anchor or the Root-of-Trust (ROT) in the TCG
terminology. The TPM is one of the specifications of the TCG,
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which forms the ROT inside a PC to provide the trusted comput-
ing features and to build trusted platforms. The cryptographic
measure computed while building the COT is a machine read-
able value, called the “ hash value”, which represents the state
(configuration) of the platform. These hash values are stored in-
side the hardware module, in this case the TPM, to protect them
from being tampered with. Later, these values are utilized to at-
test (trustworthily report) the state of the system to an external
entity such as a remote challenger, when needed to prove the
system integrity.
In specific, Figure 1.2 illustrates the process of building a
trustworthy PC utilizing a TPM that extends the trust from the
lowest layer up to the applications. Though the TPM forms the
theoretical ROT, for implementation purposes it is the Core Root
of Trust for Measurement (CRTM), a small part of Basic Input
Output System (BIOS), which acts as the actual ROT. Further,
the CRTM combined together with the TPM forms the Trusted
Building Block (TBB) of the system. According to TCG specifica-
tion, the TBB must always be trusted to build a trusted platform.
With reference to Figure 1.2, the COT begins with the measure-
ment of the BIOS by the CRTM before passing control to the boot
loader code as shown by arrow 1 (integrity check) and arrow
2 (execution flow) respectively. However, the arrow depicting
the action of storing the integrity measurement inside the TPM
and creating a log entry for stored value are not depicted in
Figure 1.2, but are performed at every stage of the COT. These
integrity check and execution flow actions continue till all the
entities in the chain are measured and their hash values are
stored securely inside the TPM. Upon request, these hash val-
ues together with the log entries can later be used to report the
trustworthiness of a system to a remote challenger and thus
allowing a secure remote access (c.f. Section 1.2).
The TCG standard specification for TPM is largely based on
the experiences from high-security smartcards and their appli-
cations. Further, the important parts of the smartcard architec-
ture and security characteristics have been consistently adopted
while designing the TPM. Similar to the way in which the smart-
card’s cryptographic mechanisms are utilized to protect the
sensitive and confidential personal data, these mechanisms can
also be utilized in the TPM. These functions when utilized in a
platform embedded with a TPM, not only ensure the integrity
of that platform but also protect the user data by providing
a secure processing environment. Thus, the TPM provides au-
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thentication and accreditation of the platform in addition to
securely storing the critical secrets such as cryptographic keys
and digital certificates.
For this task, it accordingly includes, in addition to secure
firmware principles and components, particular hardware re-
quirements of the type well-known from design principles for
high-security crypto smartcards. However, inserting a secure
TPM into the PC platform along with any other standard PC
modules does not prevent intelligent attacks performed with
hardware debugging and analysis tools. In essence, the TPM in-
creases the resistance and security level of a platform, i.e., by
storing sensitive data inside it, but it must be taken into ac-
count that a complete security of the platform is not achieved
with it. Considering that the ability of a modern computing
platform (such as a PC or a laptop) to protect sensitive infor-
mation through software alone is limited, the TPM provides a
better and more secure solution. This is because in a PC without
TPM, software cannot verify its integrity and, even if software
modifications can be detected locally, there is no mechanism
for a remote user to be assured that the software is trustworthy.
Whereas when using a TPM, the logs on the software modifica-
tions are stored inside the hardware on the TPM, which can later
be provided to the remote challenger to decide upon the trust-
worthiness of the system. Thereby, the TPM provides the abil-
ity for a computing system to run applications more securely
and to perform electronic transactions & communications more
safely.
In essence, the TPM is really nothing more than a crypto-
graphic co-processor tightly coupled to the CPU that requires
software support from the BIOS and the host operating system.
The TPM provides two classes of functionality: integrity protec-
tion and trusted storage. Both these functionalities require a ba-
sis for their security guarantees for which they use trusted root
certificates. The security guarantees are then provided through
the application of these functionalities as the system boots and
subsequently operates.
However, there are certain potential downsides of the TCG
specification that come from the aspects of un-changeable trusted
root and inability to provide the desired degree of user pri-
vacy. The first aspect when coupled with the inability to dis-
able the cryptographic measurement capability, would prevent
users from running an operating system of their choice. Thus,
it could also prevent the use of free operating systems because
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the OS kernel would have to be signed by an entity which is
a descendant of the trusted root. To cope with aspect of pri-
vacy, the TCG implements a trusted third party system where
the user presents their identity and receives an anonymous cre-
dential from an anonymity certification authority (the trusted
third party). However, there are two major problems with this
approach as illustrated below [17]. The first is that if a user re-
quests several anonymous credentials, the trusted third party
can still link all of the anonymous credentials to the user be-
cause of their knowledge of the user’s identity. The second
problem is that if the trusted third party ever conspires with
a true name certification authority then it is easy to attach the
user’s real identity with their anonymous identities by match-
ing public keys. Though the TC technology has its own positive
and negative aspects, regular updates are made by TCG to im-
prove it towards a user friendly technology.
1.2 trusted platform module
Trusted Platform Module is a tamper-resistant device with lim-
ited computational power, such as a cryptographic smartcard,
that has a processor (not programmable by the end-user), a lim-
ited amount of non-volatile storage, hardware accelerators for
performing cryptographic operations, and secure Input/Output
(I/O) interfaces. A TPM is securely bound to the motherboard
of a platform, whereas a smartcard is associated with a spe-
cific user and is portable to be used across multiple systems.
In a PC the TPM is integrated into the system over the Low Pin
Count (LPC) bus, which is utilized for communication between
the central processor and the TPM as depicted in Figure 1.3. In
general, high-speed devices are connected to the north bridge
and low-speed devices to the south bridge. The LPC bus is a
4-bit wide bus operating at a frequency of 33.3 MHz, connects
the low bandwidth devices such as the BIOS chip and the TPM
chip to the south bridge. This bus is introduced by Intel and
is a substitute for industry standard architecture (ISA) bus that
is 16-bit wide and operating at a frequency of 8.33 MHz. As
aforementioned, the CRTM is the part of BIOS, which acts as the
actual ROT is also depicted in Figure 1.3. This description is at
an higher level depicting how the TPM is integrated into the
computer system (i.e., a PC). The internal components of the
TPM itself are briefly described in the sequel.
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Figure 1.3: PC Reference Architecture of the TCG [30]
Conventionally, TPM is a microcontroller-based chip with hard-
wired engines for various cryptographic schemes such as Rivest
Shamir Adleman (RSA), Secure Hash Algorithm-1 (SHA-1), and
Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) as depicted
in Figure 1.4 [22]. The commands given to the TPM are pro-
cessed by an execution engine, which is a microcontroller, with
the help of Random Access Memory (RAM) (a working mem-
ory) and Read Only Memory (ROM) (memory with stored pro-
gram code) on it. The cryptographic memory units of the TPM
comprises of two storage units i.e., one non-volatile and the
other volatile. The non-volatile unit stores the sensitive crypto-
graphic data such as keys and credentials that are unique to the
platform and the volatile unit is utilized for storing the system
state and temporary keys. In essence, utilizing the above fea-
tures, the TPM provides a hardware-based security to the sys-
tem (user) artifacts such as data, certificates, passwords, and
other cryptographic keys.
An useful application of the TPM in a general-purpose com-
puting system, i.e., hard drive encryption, is described in the
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Figure 1.4: Conventional TPM Architecture [30]
following. In a PC without TPM, encrypted data and encryption
keys are usually stored on the same hard drive. With this, an
attacker can mount this hard drive onto another computer to
disclose the keys and thus the data. In contrast, a PC enabled
with TPM stores the encryption keys on the TPM and thus pre-
vents an unauthorized access to the data. From this, it may be
said that the security of modern computing platforms is en-
hanced via the use of a trusted hardware i.e., the TPM. There
are the firms such as Atmel, Broadcom, ST Microelectronics,
Infineon, Sinosun and Intel which manufacture the TPM hard-
ware. On the other hand, several vendors in the market such as
Acer, Asus, Dell, LG, Fujitsu, HP, Lenovo, Samsung, Sony, and
Toshiba provide TPM integration on their devices.
A trusted computing architecture utilizing a TPM provides a
trusted system utilizing the following key concepts [7]:
memory curtaining
Memory curtaining refers to a strong, hardware-enforced
memory isolation feature to prevent programs (by execut-
ing them in their own address spaces) from being able
to read or write one another’s memory. In its current de-
sign, an intruder or malicious code can often read or alter
sensitive data in a PC’s memory whereas in the trusted
computing design, even the OS should not have access to
curtained memory. Thus, an intruder who gains control
of the OS itself would not be able to interfere with pro-
gram’s secure memory. Although memory isolation can
be achieved in software, this requires some combination
of rewriting operating systems, device drivers, and possi-
bly even application software. Implementing this feature
in hardware instead permits greater backwards compati-
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bility with existing software and reduces the quantity of
software which must be rewritten.
secure input and output
The aim of secure input and output feature is to address
the threats posed by keyloggers and screen-grabbers, soft-
ware used by snoops and intruders to spy on computer
user’s activities. A keylogger records what you type, and
a screen-grabber records what is displayed on the screen.
To avoid this, the secure input and output feature pro-
vides a secure hardware path from the keyboard to an
application and from the application back to the screen.
This is achieved by encrypting the I/O stream right up
to the point that the output device outputs data or from
the point that the input device inputs data. No other soft-
ware running on the same PC will be able to determine
what the user typed, or how the application responded.
At the same time, secure input and output will allow pro-
grams to determine whether their input is provided by a
physically present user, as distinct from another program
impersonating a user.
sealed storage
Sealed storage addresses a major PC security failing i.e.,
the inability of a PC to securely store cryptographic keys.
Customarily, the keys and passwords that protect private
documents or accounts are stored locally on the computer’s
hard drive, alongside the documents themselves. This may
be compared to leaving the combination to a safe in the
same room with the safe itself. In practice, intruders who
break into a computer can frequently copy decryption and
signing keys from that computer’s hard drive.
To address this issue, the sealed storage idea was concep-
tualized which generates keys based, in part, on the iden-
tity of the software requesting to use them and, in part,
on the identity of the computer on which that software is
running. The result is that the keys themselves need not
be stored on the hard drive but can be generated when-
ever they are needed, provided that authorized software
tries to generate them on an authorized machine. If a pro-
gram other than the program that originally encrypted, or
sealed, private data should attempt to decrypt, or unseal,
that data, the attempt is guaranteed to fail. Similarly, if the
data is copied in encrypted form to a different machine,
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attempts to decrypt it will continue to be unsuccessful.
Thus, sealed storage represents a clever solution to a pre-
viously intractable key storage problem. Sealed storage
combined together with memory curtaining and secure
input and output feature ensures that the user data on
a system can only be read by that specific computer and
only by the particular software with which it is created.
Even if an intruder or a virus deliberately alters the en-
cryption software, it will no longer be able to decrypt the
data and thus the data is protected.
remote attestation
Remote attestation is the most significant of the four ma-
jor features, which broadly aims to detect the unautho-
rized changes to software. If an attacker has replaced one
of the applications or a part of the OS on the platform with
a maliciously altered version, it would be detected by uti-
lizing remote attestation feature. This is because the attes-
tation is remote, i.e., the other party with whom the plat-
form interacts will be able to detect the alteration and thus
can avoid sending sensitive data to a compromised sys-
tem. However, the current TCG approach to the remote at-
testation is flawed because it conspicuously fails to distin-
guish between applications that protect computer owners
against an attack and applications that protect a computer
against its owner itself. In effect, the computer’s owner is
sometimes treated as just another attacker or adversary
who must be prevented from breaking in and altering the
computer’s software.
Remote attestation works by generating, in hardware, a
cryptographic certificate attesting to the identity of the
software currently running on a PC. However, there is no
determination of whether the software is good or bad, or
whether it is compromised or not compromised. The iden-
tity in here is represented by a cryptographic hash, which
allows different programs to be distinguished from one
another or to detect changes in their code. This certificate
may, at the PC user’s request, be provided to any remote
party, and in principle has the effect of proving to that
party that the machine is using expected and unaltered
software. If the software on the machine has been altered,
the certificate generated will reflect this and then the re-
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mote party can decide whether to interact with the user
or not.
trusted third party
One of the main obstacles the TCG technology had to over-
come was how to maintain the anonymity while still pro-
viding a ”trusted platform". The main objective of obtain-
ing a ”trusted mode" is how system B, with whom Sys-
tem A may be communicating, can trust that the latter is
running an un-tampered hardware and software. For this,
the latter has to inform the former that it is using ”regis-
tered" and ”safe" software and hardware, thereby poten-
tially uniquely identifying itself. This might not be a prob-
lem where one party wishes to be identified by the other
party, e.g., during banking transactions over the Internet.
But in many other types of communicating activities the
anonymity provided by the system may be a mandatory
requirement. The TCG acknowledges this, and has devel-
oped a process of attaining such anonymity but at the
same time assuring the other party that it is communicat-
ing with a ”trusted party". This is achieved by an entity
referred to as ”trusted third party", which acts as an inter-
mediary between the two parties and is utilized during
the remote attestation process.
Each of these above concepts are desired to enhance the com-
puter security, because each may be used by appropriate soft-
ware to prevent or mitigate real attacks currently performed
against PCs. Thus, a PC with hardware support for these con-
cepts can provide security guarantees that might be difficult to
offer without hardware support. Although trusted computing
technology can not prevent computer security holes altogether,
it seeks to contain and limit the damage that can result from a
particular flaw. For instance, it should not be possible for a cod-
ing flaw in one application (like a web browser) to be abused
to copy or alter data from a different application (like a word
processor). This sort of isolation and containment approach is
an important area of computer security research and is used
in many different approaches to computer security, including
promising techniques outside of trusted computing. However,
to utilize the new capabilities of the PC obtained through TC, a
software support is necessary which is already specified by TCG
and is referred to as TCG Software Stack (TSS) [90]. This soft-
ware stack provides an abstract interface to the applications on
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Figure 1.5: Trusted Software Stack [30]
the system such that they can easily access the functionalities
of the TPM.
The multi-layer framework of the TSS [22], depicted in Fig-
ure 1.5, is illustrated in the following:
tpm device driver
TPM Device Driver (TDD) is not a part of the TSS, but part
of the (extended) operating system kernel. It must be ad-
dressed with the TCG Device Driver Library (TDDL) and
the corresponding port, the TCG Device Driver Library
Interface (TDDLI), from the TSS components. This is sup-
ported by current operating systems (Linux kernel version
2.6.18, Windows Vista, Windows 7, and Windows 8) but
previously (until TPM version 1.1) for each manufacturer
a special driver had to be used.
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tcg device driver library
The TDDL is available in user-mode of the OS which con-
trols the transition between kernel-mode and user-mode.
Through an implementation of the interface in user-mode,
it is neutralized from operating system, such that differ-
ent TSS implementations can communicate with each TPM.
The TDDLI allows an easy implementation of the TPM sim-
ulator (see [86]). The simultaneous TPM access is controlled
by higher layers, thus only one instance of the TDDL is re-
quired.
tcg core services
The TCG Core Services (TCS) are part of the user-mode
OS services, which provide the interface, TCG Core Ser-
vices Interface (TCSI), for the service provider and imple-
ment the four basic services of TSS including: The context
manager which controls the concurrent access to the TPM.
The key & credential manager implementing the key man-
agement and secure storage of key material outside of
the TPM. The event manager that managing the entries in
the event log in the form of cryptographic measurements
and access to the corresponding Platform Configuration
Registers (PCRs). Responsibility for serialization, synchro-
nization and transmission of commands to the TPM.
tcg service provider
The TCG Service Provider (TSP) is also a part of the OS
service, which provides functions that go beyond the TPM
functionality. An important component of the TSP is the
one with cryptographic functions and interfaces that needs
only slight adjustments to be used for existing applica-
tions.
Utilizing the aforementioned hardware (TPM) and software
(TSS) specifications from TCG, a hardware-based root of trust is
provided to a given platform. The trust anchor or the ROT being
the critical component of the security architecture, its integrity
compromise would jeopardize the security of the entire system.
Thus, the TCG demands its implementation in hardware, be-
cause it is safer than an equivalent implementation in software.
Further, to uniquely identify a system, a forgery or a copy of
the system must be ruled out, a requirement which can only be
ensured by utilizing a hardware-based ROT.
Some of the applications where TPMs can be employed are
described below:
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personal computing
In PCs, the TPM may be used for full disk encryption and
password protection. Full disk encryption applications, such
as the BitLocker Drive Encryption of Microsoft’s operat-
ing systems i.e., Windows Vista and Windows 7, use the
TPM chip in conjunction with the included disk encryption
software named BitLocker [41]. The Bitlocker technology
is used to protect the keys used to encrypt the computer’s
hard disk and to provide integrity authentication for a
trusted boot-up process. System artifacts such as crypto-
graphic keys, passwords, and digital certificates are more
secure against software attacks and physical thefts as the
authentication mechanism is shifted to hardware when
using a TPM.
virtualization
Virtualization technology provides concepts and methods
for sharing or combining of hardware resources between
computer systems, especially in servers [101]. This enables
to run multiple operating system instances, referred as
Virtual Machines (VMs) or guests, on a single real com-
puter called host machine. Virtualization is gaining im-
portance in academia and industry because it increases
the overall utilization of resources and provides economic
benefits. This can be seen from the fact that Intel and
AMD have added virtualization support for their proces-
sor architectures to support multiple VMs on a single en-
tity [94, 12]. To provide the VMs with trusted computing
features, the host machine utilizes a TPM chip which en-
hances the security of the individual VMs and thus the
whole system together.
mobile computing
Consider a mobile platform scenario in which the device
manufacturer, cellular service provider, application ser-
vice provider, and the user himself act as different stake-
holders. Here, the task of the mobile platform is to pro-
vide a trustworthy attestation of the current state of each
of their applications to the respective stakeholder where
a TPM may be deployed.
cloud computing
In cloud computing, the applications and the data are no
longer on the local computer or local data centers, but in
[ July 18, 2013 at 11:31 ]
18 introduction
a central computing server. In such a scenario, the user
must trust that his applications and data on the remote
server are safe in which case a TPM may be used for a
trustworthy operation.
Though there are many other application fields for TPMs, the
application scenario in this work refers to a general-purpose
computing system i.e., a PC.
1.3 problem definition
With the ability to provide the aforementioned security features,
the TPM is gaining an increasing acceptance in the industry
and in personal computing which led to its wide range deploy-
ment. According to market analysis, already over 300 million
TCG-compliant TPM chips are included in many business lap-
top and desktop systems [28]. In contrast with this penetration,
the question arises whether the concept of hard-wired crypto-
graphic engines will cope with the increasing sophistication
and security requirements of future systems and the ever ex-
panding threats and violations. This is because, it is well-known
that cryptographic schemes, also those embedded in TPMs, have
always been subject to persistent cryptanalysis and recently to
side-channel analysis either by malicious attackers or by the re-
search community. Given that, the question arises: Do we have
to throw away all the TPMs and lose the data protected by them,
if someday a cryptographic engine on the TPM becomes inse-
cure? Consider that either the hash engine (SHA-1) or the asym-
metric engine (RSA) on the TPM is compromised, i.e., found to
be no more secure. This implies that all the security functions
such as remote attestation and sealed storage, as detailed be-
fore, that rely on these engines can not be trusted anymore.
There exist a few publications in the literature which indi-
cate that this threat of insecure cryptographic algorithms is in-
deed true. For instance, Wang et al. [98] showed the collision
search attacks for the SHA-1 algorithm and Finke et al. [42] con-
ducted a side-channel attack on the RSA key generator. Further,
in [23], Bruschi et al. have presented a replay attack during the
execution of the TPM authorization protocol that compromises
the correct behavior of the trusted platform. Also, Sadeghi et
al. have tested several TPM chips for compliance to TCG spec-
ifications and were able to find weaknesses with those chips
as described in [80]. Additionally, considering the scale of de-
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ployment in the market as mentioned before, replacing a com-
promised TPM with a new one every time certain engine gets
compromised is certainly not economically feasible.
Considering these and other threats and violations, and fol-
lowing the general recommendation regarding the necessity
of updating cryptographic algorithms, e.g., those published by
NIST [71] and proposed by Preneel [76], the idea of hard-wiring
the TPM security engines began to be questioned. This can be
seen from the specification of the next generation TPM (called
TPM.next) [88] by TCG. In particular, this specification allows
the replacement of cryptographic algorithms in case of a com-
promise or even for boosting the TPM performance. In spite of
this agreement on their necessity, technical solutions for the up-
date of TPM’s cryptographic engines have not been proposed in
the literature, so far.
1.4 thesis contribution and organization
To address the issue of compromised (or broken) cryptographic
engines on a TPM, a novel concept called Sustainable Trusted
Computing (STC), is presented in this thesis. The core idea of
this concept is to design a novel architecture, referred to as Sus-
tainable Trusted Platform Module (STPM), which can support
a flexible and secure update of the cryptographic engines on
the TPM and then to re-establish the trust in the system after an
update. To achieve this, the STPM comprises of static and recon-
figurable parts in its architecture. The static part is equipped
with the un-interruptedly executing components such as the
execution engine (for TPM command execution), an update al-
gorithm (for securely loading new cryptographic engines), and
an interaction between them. In contrast, the reconfigurable
part of the architecture consists of the locations for loading the
new cryptographic engines as needed. Further, essential com-
ponents such as non-volatile and volatile memories for crypto-
graphic keys and platform state storage respectively, are also
integrated into the architecture. To evaluate the STPM design, a
proof-of-concept implementation is performed utilizing a Field
Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) as its base component. The
considered FPGA supports a special feature called Partial Reconfiguration
(PR), utilizing which the FPGA is divided into static and reconfig-
urable parts as required by the STPM design. Each of these parts
contain the necessary components for performing a successful
update and to provide all the necessary TPM functionalities. To
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show the applicability of the STPM and/or its individual com-
ponents, two different scenarios are chosen and evaluated.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows:
• A thorough architectural and functional description of
all the building blocks of the current state-of-the-art TPM,
specified by the TCG, is given in Chapter 2. Further, an in-
depth analysis of the effect of every compromised crypto-
graphic engine of the TPM on its functionalities is carried
out and corresponding countermeasures are discussed.
• Based on this analysis, a set of functional and non-functional
requirements that lead to a set of architectural specifi-
cations and consequently to designing a novel generic
updatable TPM architecture, i.e., the STPM, is described
in Chapter 3. Additionally, the major components of the
STPM architecture which provide all the security functions
with reference to conventional TPM are detailed. Consid-
ering that the major functionality of the STPM architecture
is to provide a secure update and re-establish the trust in
the system, an analysis of the same is performed utilizing
two fundamental cryptographic engines on it.
• A proof-of-concept implementation of the STPM architec-
ture utilizing available components in the market is de-
tailed in Chapter 4. In addition to illustrating the resource
consumption of the STPM design on the target platform,
an update of the fundamental cryptographic engines uti-
lizing the implemented design is also detailed.
• Two real world applications, i.e., Intellectual Property (IP)
protection in embedded systems and security in real-time
systems, that may utilize the features of the STPM are eval-
uated in Chapter 5.
• Chapter 6 concludes the thesis and highlights some future
research directions.
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T R U S T E D P L A T F O R M M O D U L E
Though the TCG’s specifications for TPM version 1.2 are exten-
sive and complex ranging over 700 pages, we concentrate here
only on the concepts that are relevant to this thesis. For this,
first the building blocks of state-of-the-art TPM architecture are
detailed before explaining the security functions provided by
it [56]. Then a thorough analysis of the security level of each
building block is carried out to illustrate the effect on corre-
sponding functionalities due to the possible attacks on the build-
ing blocks.
The fundamental feature of the TPM is to provide a hardware-
based security to the sensitive data on a platform. This form
of security ensures that the information stored in hardware is
better protected from external software attacks. Using this fea-
ture, a variety of applications storing secrets on a TPM can be
developed, which make it much harder to access information
on computing devices without proper authorization (e.g., if the
device was stolen). Further, if the configuration of the platform
has changed as a result of unauthorized activities, access to
data and secrets can be denied and sealed off using these appli-
cations. However, it is noteworthy to state that the TPM cannot
control the software that is running on a PC. The TPM can only
store the pre run-time configuration parameters, but it is the
other applications that determine and implement policies asso-
ciated with this information.
For example, processes that need to secure secrets, such as
digital signing, can be made more secure with a TPM. Mission
critical applications requiring greater security, such as secure
email or secure document management, can offer a greater level
of protection when using a TPM. If at boot time it is determined
that a PC is not trustworthy because of unexpected changes
in configuration, access to highly secure applications can be
blocked until the issue is remedied. However, this is possible
only if a policy has been set up that requires such an action.
Additionally, with a TPM, one can be more certain that artifacts
necessary to sign secure email messages have not been affected
by software attacks. Further, with the use of remote attestation,
other platforms in the trusted network can make a determina-
21
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tion, to which extent they can trust information from another
PC. Attestation or any other TPM function does not transmit
personal information of the user of the platform. These capabil-
ities can improve security in many areas of computing, includ-
ing e-commerce, citizen-to-government applications, confiden-
tial government communications and many other fields where
greater security is required. Also, hardware-based security can
improve protection for Virtual Private Network (VPN), wireless
networks, file encryption (as in Microsoft’s BitLocker) and pass-
word/credentials management.
2.1 tpm building blocks
The essential building blocks of today’s TPMs that provide the
fundamental security functions of the TCG specification, are de-
picted in Figure 1.4. These various blocks are hard-wired and
may be categorized into three different groups: cryptographic
engines, cryptographic memory units, and a processing unit.
The cryptographic engines unit comprises of various crypto-
graphic algorithms that perform the operations required by
the security functions. In order to perform these operations,
the TPM requires some cryptographic keys and platform state,
which are stored in different memories of the cryptographic
memory unit. To supplement these, the processing unit com-
prises of an execution engine (a microcontroller) and the firmware
to execute the commands given to the TPM.
In the following, each of the block and its functionality is
detailed:
key generator
This block is an asymmetric key generator which utilizes
the RSA algorithm [79] to generate the keys required by
the TPM. The generated keys are public/private key pairs
of size 2048-bit, which is the minimum recommended key
size by the TCG.
rsa engine
This is an asymmetric engine that performs the encryp-
tion and decryption operations on the data (and keys) to
be protected by the TPM. Furthermore, this engine is uti-
lized for digital signature generation/verification, as re-
quired during remote attestation process. Together with
the Storage Root Key (SRK) and the key generator, the RSA
engine builds the TPM key hierarchy.
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sha-1 engine
This is a hash engine utilized to compute the digest of the
existing hardware or a loaded software on the platform,
that represents the state of the platform. The SHA-1 engine
makes use of 160-bit SHA-1 hash algorithm [43] thus, the
produced digest is also of size 160 bits (20 bytes). Consid-
ering that the TPM is not a cryptographic accelerator, there
are no TCG specified minimum throughput requirements
for the engines of the TPM.
hmac engine
HMAC is a Message Authentication Code (MAC), which
utilizes a cryptographic hash function and a symmetric
key mainly for testing the authenticity of messages. This
engine utilizes the HMAC algorithm that must be imple-
mented as specified in RFC 2104 [58] standardization. The
HMAC engine is required to provide authorization to all
the TPM commands and the related data during a com-
mand execution. The TCG specification specifies the use
of SHA-1 in HMAC, resulting in a key length of 20 bytes
and a block size of 64 bytes. The HMAC function is only
available internal to the TPM.
random number generator
This block is the source of entropy which generates hardware-
based true random numbers to be utilized by the TPM for
key generation and nonces. The Random Number Generator
(RNG) consists of a state-machine that accepts and mixes
unpredictable data and a post-processor that uses a one-
way function (e.g., SHA-1).
opt-in
This component is utilized to enable/disable the TPM. How-
ever, the TPM is disabled by default and the owner may
enable it via the Opt-in.
non-volatile storage
This block stores the sensitive cryptographic data i.e., the
Endorsement Key (EK) and the SRK of the TPM. Whereas
the EK uniquely identifies the given platform, the SRK is
utilized to take ownership and to build the key hierarchy
of the TPM. The other sensitive information stored inside
this memory is the TPM permanent flags and the owner
authorization secret (described later). These flags deter-
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mine the configuration of the TPM such as its working
state and optionally also affect its functionality.
volatile storage
The significant part of the volatile storage are the PCRs
which store the hash values of the entities measured by
the TPM during the boot process of a system. Other part
of this storage being the key slot which stores the tem-
porarily generated keys before loading them on and off
the TPM. Further, the volatile storage holds the handles
(abstract references) for the TPM keys and for the autho-
rized sessions.
execution engine
This component is an 8-bit microcontroller and together
with the working memory RAM, it executes the TPM com-
mands by utilizing the program code available in ROM.
i/o block
The I/O block is an interface between the central processor
on the system and the TPM blocks, that provides a secure
flow of data between them. For this, it performs encoding
and decoding of information passed over internal and ex-
ternal bus.
The TPM utilizes symmetric encryption unit such as Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES), only for internal operations such as
encrypting the authentication data, i.e., passwords and PINs to
secure data to be communicated or stored outside of it. There
are additional components inside the TPM such as the mono-
tonic counters and sensors which are needed to prevent replay
attacks and detect physical attacks (tampering), respectively.
Thus, the security of the whole system is based on the protec-
tion and secrecy of the TPM’s cryptographic system, especially
against reading out or manipulation of the key material. In a
typical computer system, the TPM is enclosed in a secure pack-
age and is affixed to the motherboard of that device. Figure 2.1
depicts such a binding of a security chip (Atmel TPM) to the
motherboard (Asus) of a PC to enhance the security of the sys-
tem.
The TCG specification defines two generic portions of the TPM:
shielded locations and protected capabilities. The data inside
a shielded location is protected against the interference from
an outside exposure. The non-volatile storage with EK and SRK
data is a shielded location of the TPM. In contrast, the protected
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Figure 2.1: TPM chip on a motherboard [44]
capability is a function that can access (read/write) a shielded
location. The function ”take ownership" is one such protected
capability which creates a new root key (i.e., SRK) of the TPM
key hierarchy. Further, a correct operation of the protected ca-
pabilities is necessary for a trusted operation of the TCG sub-
system. Both shielded locations and protected capabilities are
implemented in hardware and therefore are resistant against
software attacks.
Some of the TPM features are explained in the following. The
TPM is only a platform component but not a complete platform
by itself. However, it is becoming a common component on
many business desktop and laptop systems. The TPM is not an
active component i.e., it only responds to commands from the
processor but does not initiate any interrupts or such opera-
tions. Further, the TPM cannot alter the execution flow of the
system such as booting or execution of applications. In sum-
mary, the TPM is a shielded and encapsulated chip with a con-
trolled interface to the external environment.
The life cycle of a TPM is depicted in Figure 2.2. First, the TPM
is in Power off state, if it is off or in a power saving state. After
power-up or a reset the TPM goes into the initialization state.
The reset is performed by executing the TPM_Init command,
which is not transmitted from a software component but is em-
bedded in the hardware of the TPM. Then according to specifi-
cations, the BIOS sends the command TPM_Startup within the
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Power off
Initialization
Selftest
Operational Selftest failure
TPM_Init
TPM_Startup
TPM_ContinueSelfTest
TPM_SaveState
(optional)
Figure 2.2: TPM Life Cycle [30]
CRTM, utilizing which the TPM transits into the Selftest state.
From this state, the TPM either moves into an Operational state if
the Selftest passes else moves into Selftest failure state. Once op-
erational, the TPM may save the state of the platform and then
moves into Power off state.
However, the operating states of the TPM may be changed
for security reasons by the platform owner and critical state
changes can be accomplished only with physical presence. There
are three possible pairs of states for the TPM: Disabled/Enabled,
Deactivated/Activated, and Owned/Unowned. State transitions
can be achieved by executing various TPM commands in each
state. An example of such a TPM command is the TPM_DisablePubekRead,
which mandates the detection of the physical presence and pre-
vents the reading of the EK without the owner password.
2.2 tpm keys
An important feature of the TPM is to provide and manage the
key hierarchy. It can internally generate RSA keys, for which the
key generator and the RNG are used. Through the generation of
cryptographic keys inside the TPM, it is possible that the private
part of a key does not have to leave the TPM in a clear form and
therefore is only known to the TPM. Key pairs can be used to
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digitally sign (signing key) and encrypt the data storage (stor-
age keys). All the keys generated by the TPM are the RSA key
pairs with public and private part for each key in a given key
pair. Though the typical RSA key lengths can be 512, 1024 or
2048 bits, the TCG recommends only the use of 2048 bit.
The keys generated by the TPM have different attributes that
indicate the allowed usage and the level of protection. Every
TPM has a set of foundational keys, i.e., the EK and the SRK,
and all the other keys are generated using these keys. Due to
the fact that the TPM has limited memory on-board, the newly
generated keys must be stored outside of it on a mass storage
device (e.g., hard disk). Additionally, key slots are required for
temporary storage of the keys while loading them in and out
of the TPM. However, the newly generated keys, referred to as
child keys, can not be stored in a clear text form thus every gen-
erated child key pair is protected by an associated parent key
pair. For this, the private part of the child key pair is encrypted
by the public part of its parent key before the former key leaves
the TPM. To utilize the child key for a certain operation, it must
first be loaded into the TPM for decrypting with the private
part of its parent key. This loading of the keys into an external
memory creates a hierarchy, referred to as TPM key hierarchy,
as depicted in Figure 2.3. The illustrated key hierarchy, which
is typical inside a PC, depicts only the required components of
the TPM for building it.
The different types of keys specified by the TCG may be de-
scribed as follows:
migratable and non-migratable keys
Non-Migratable keys such as EK and SRK are bound to a
given platform and are not allowed to leave the TPM thus
protecting the sensitive data encrypted by them. In con-
trast, migratable keys are the ones which can be migrated
to a different platform but only under the authorization
of the TPM owner. Migratable keys may be needed in case
that there is a change in the TPM version but the user is
not willing to update the key hierarchy.
storage keys
These keys are utilized to encrypt data or other keys, thus
storing the other keys securely outside of the TPM. This
encryption and storage of keys, referred to as key wrap-
ping, builds the key hierarchy. Further, storage keys are at
the top of the key hierarchy, which can only generate the
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Figure 2.3: Typical TPM Key Hierarchy inside a PC [30]
child keys. A special storage key is the SRK, explained be-
low, forms the Root-of-Trust for Storage (RTS) of the TPM.
signing keys
Signing keys are utilized to digitally sign the data. These
keys may be either tied to a given platform or may be
migrated to a new platform.
binding keys
In general, these are the symmetric keys that encrypt large
amounts of data outside the TPM called as hybrid encryp-
tion. Binding keys can be migrated to other platforms.
endorsement key
The EK is a public/private key pair, generated usually by
the manufacturer or vendor of the TPM as part of the man-
ufacturing process. The entity that creates the EK must
provide a credential (certificate) certifying that this key
pair is valid and was generated in the specified manner.
Typically, this entity is the manufacturer of the TPM. The
EK uniquely identifies a TPM and thus the platform, which
cause privacy concerns with this key. EK is utilized to at-
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test the authenticity of the values produced by the TPM.
The EK is non-migratable and can only be used in care-
fully controlled ways, such as creating identity keys as de-
tailed below. This key forms the Root-of-Trust for Reporting
(RTR) of the TPM.
attestation identity key
Attestation Identity Keys (AIKs) are non-migratable key-
pairs that are essentially aliases to the EK. Due to pri-
vacy concerns, the EK is not used to sign any information
originating from a TPM. As a non-migratable key, the pri-
vate portion of an AIK never leaves the TPM in plaintext
form and is used only for signing data originated by the
TPM, such as PCR values during remote attestation. The EK
is statistically unique, whereas multiple AIKs (acting as
pseudonyms for the EK) may be generated by the owner
of the TPM thus mitigating privacy concerns.
storage root key
The SRK is a non-migratable keypair that is generated in-
ternally to the TPM while taking ownership of the plat-
form. The private part of this key never leaves the TPM.
This key is at the root of the TPM key hierarchy and is
used for secure storage of all the other keys below it. Fur-
ther, when setting up a TPM owner, the owner authoriza-
tion secret which is a 160-bit long hash representation of
the owner’s password is stored in the TPM. This password
is encrypted with the public part of the EK and therefore
can only be decrypted by the TPM.
In order to use a stored key, its private part must first be
loaded into the TPM for decryption by its private parent key.
If the child key to be used is not the SRK, then all the storage
keys in the path from SRK to the key to be used must be loaded
recursively. The key is then stored in a key slot and a reference
(key handle) is addressed. However, the number of key slots is
limited, therefore the TCG recommended temporary paging is
to be used for a storage medium, which is managed by the key
cache manager. This manager may be part of the TSS, as well as
managing the key hierarchy, i.e., the assignment of child keys
to parent keys.
As a self-protection measure, the TPM implements two ROTs:
Root-of-Trust for Reporting and Root-of-Trust for Storage. The
RTR is the foundation for the unambiguous identification of the
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platform and the RTS is the basis for secure data storage. Their
integrity is protected by the capability of TPM to resist software
and hardware attacks. Further, the TCG prompted a number of
protective mechanisms such as the safety-critical information
(e.g., EK) should not be read via the contacts of the TPM mi-
crochip (e.g., by pin probing). The TPM must be using a solder
joint or integrated with other components (e.g., South Bridge)
and shall be secured to the platform. An attempt to remove
EK and SRK, i.e., tampering with the TPM device, is detected
and countermeasures to prevent the compromise are provided.
For example, voltage, clock frequency and other aspects of the
TPM’s operating environment may be monitored for signs of
tampering.
2.3 tpm security functions
The TPM provides four fundamental security functions: integrity
measurement, remote attestation, binding, and sealing.
integrity measurement , storage , and reporting
With this function the platform configuration and the pro-
cesses running on it are measured cryptographically by
determining their hash values. These values are stored in-
side the PCRs and further a history of events is kept in the
Stored Measurement Log (SML). There are at least 16 PCRs
in a TPM and a PCR is not written directly but by a pro-
cess called ”extend operation" illustrated below. The SML
resides in the hard drive (outside, and not protected by
a TPM). To provide integrity measurement functionality, the
TPM utilizes the SHA-1 engine.
The following notation is given for describing the integrity
measurement process:
entity An executable application, a config-
uration file or a data file in a PC plat-
form
SHA− 1 Hash algorithm
measurement Measured hash value of the entity
by utilizing SHA− 1
PCR Register for storing the measurement
The “PCR extend" operation is described as follows:
PCR⇐ SHA− 1(PCR||measurement) (2.1)
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A new measurement value is concatenated ("||” symbol)
with the current PCR value and then hashed by SHA-1 such
that the result will be stored as a new value of the PCR.
The advantage of the extend operation is that it is infea-
sible to find two different measurement values such that
when they are extended return the same value. Further,
the operation preserves the order in which entities’ mea-
surements were extended (for example, extending entity
A then entity B results in a different value than extending
B then A). Additionally, the operation allows unlimited
number of measurements to be stored in a PCR, because
the result is always a 160-bit value.
In a COT, if an entity B is loaded after the entity A, then
B is measured by A before passing control to B. Further,
the measurement is stored into a PCR, by an extend oper-
ation, and also into the SML. The benefit of following this
order is that B can not lie about its existence i.e., the fact
that it had been loaded and run. Assuming that if B is a
malicious program, it tries to avoid being detected by re-
moving its measurement in the SML. However, B can not
remove its measurement from the PCR, because the PCR
is protected at the hardware level. Additionally, no part
of the system can write directly to the PCR, except the
TPM, and it is computationally infeasible to find another
program whose hash value is the same as B. Thus, the in-
tegrity measurement mechanism guarantees an unforgeable
record of all the entities that have been loaded, with the
help of the SML and the TPM. However, in most systems,
the PCR and the SML keep only a single measurement of
each loaded program and does not take into account sub-
sequent loads of the same program, as well as number of
times it is loaded. Though taking the measurement every
time a program loaded reflects the live configuration of
the platform, it slows the speed of operation of the sys-
tem and affects its scalability.
remote attestation
The trustworthy reporting of the platform configuration
to a remote challenger is called remote attestation. The TPM
provides a set of PCR values representing the system state
and the SML to the challenger. These values are signed
using the AIK private key. The remote party is able to
compare the measurement results with reference values
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Challenger (remote) Attestator (TPM) TTP
Request for Attestation
AIKpub, TPM_Credentials
(AIK_Certificate)TTP
PCRAIK,SML, (AIK_Cert)TTP
Figure 2.4: Remote Attestation Protocol [8]
that indicate the trusted platform configurations. These
reference values are usually listed in a public Reference
Measurement List (RML). For providing the remote attes-
tation functionality, the TPM utilizes both RSA and SHA-1
engines.
The remote attestation protocol utilizing a Trusted Third
Party (TTP), i.e., a privacy certification authority, is de-
picted in Figure 2.4. The challenger requests for an attes-
tation to the system with TPM on it i.e., the attestator. For
this, the attestator generates an AIK and sends its public
part to a TTP along with the TPM credentials. In turn, the
TTP generates a certificate for the AIK and sends it back to
the attestator. The attestator signs the PCR values with the
private part of the AIK and sends them to the challenger
along with the obtained certificate and the SML. The chal-
lenger verifies the obtained signature and recomputes the
hash values using the SML to decide upon the trustworthi-
ness of the attestator.
binding
This functionality binds the data (usually the cryptographic
keys) to a given platform. It utilizes asymmetric encryp-
tion to store the keys in the key hierarchy managed by the
particular TPM. To bind the data, RSA engine of the TPM
and a migratable key are utilized. The migratable key uti-
lized in binding gives the flexibility to decrypt the user’s
encrypted data by another TPM.
Binding⇒ EncryptMigratable_Key(Data) (2.2)
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Security Function Involved Cryptographic En-
gines
Integrity Measurement SHA-1
Remote Attestation RSA, SHA-1
Binding RSA
Sealing RSA, SHA-1
Table 2.1: TPM Security Functions Mapped to TPM Building Blocks
sealing
Sealing extends the binding functionality by tying it to the
platform state i.e., the data along with certain set of PCR
values are encrypted together. Therefore, the data which
has been encrypted at some platform state, can only be
decrypted if the platform is exactly in the same state. In
addition to RSA engine, the TPM utilizes a non-migratable
key and a set of requested PCR values to seal the data.
Sealing⇒ EncryptNon_Migratable_Key(Data||PCR_Values)
(2.3)
To decrypt the sealed data, one must be running the same
TPM, have the key, and the current PCR value has to match
with the value used in the sealing process. For example,
consider a document is sealed with a TPM-generated non-
migratable key, and PCR values indicating that Microsoft
Word and Symantec antivirus must have been loaded. In
order to read the contents of this document, other users
must have access to the key, be using Microsoft Word and
Symantec antivirus software in the same TPM otherwise,
the data remains sealed.
All the aforementioned security functions rely on one or more
cryptographic engines as detailed in Table 2.1. Therefore, a com-
promise of one of these engines leads to a damage of at least
one of the security functions. For instance, if the SHA-1 engine
is attacked, neither of the security functions will be available ex-
cept for the binding functionality. Similarly, if RSA algorithm is
compromised, except for integrity measurement no security func-
tionality is reliable. Note that the HMAC engine is not listed in
Table 2.1 as it does not directly support any of the main secu-
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Parameter Length Description Byte Byte Byte Byte
1 2 Authorization Tag TPM_TAG
2 4 Parameter Size UINT32
3 4 Ordinal TPM_COMMAND_CODE
4 . . . n . . . Payload (opt.) . . .
Table 2.2: Components of a TPM-Command [30]
rity functions. However, HMAC engine is essential for data and
command authorization and is therefore intrinsically essential
for all the security functions. Given that the HMAC utilizes the
same hash engine already available on the TPM, a compromised
SHA-1 implies that all the security functions are compromised,
as commands can not be securely issued anymore.
2.4 tpm commands
The TPM is controlled by TPM-commands that are communi-
cated generally over the LPC bus. The TPM-command is sent
as an input to the TPM and after processing the TPM sends
back the TPM-response. In both cases, i.e., the command and the
response, there are sequences of bytes with defined structure
which are transmitted over the LPC bus from most significant to
least significant byte. It is clear that the TPM is designed as a pas-
sive component that can not intervene on its own into the oper-
ation of a system. The general components of a TPM-command
are illustrated in Table 2.2. The authorization tag indicates the
form of authorization required by the given command. The size
parameter specifies the total number of bytes that make up the
command and the ordinal specifies the command to which it
is actually referring to. Optionally, depending on the command
type one or more parameters of various lengths (referred to as
the payload) such as handles, nonces, hashes, data values are
also required by a command.
The TPM-response that is sent in response by the TPM, is com-
posed similar, as shown in Table 2.3. Instead of ordinals as afore-
mentioned, in the return code there are status signals which
indicate the successful or failed execution of a TPM-command.
Complete details of all the commands and their responses are
detailed in the TPM specification [8].
However, safety-critical commands to the TPM such as the
TPM_TakeOwnership may be given only with prior authoriza-
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Parameter Length Description Byte Byte Byte Byte
1 2 Authorization Tag TPM_TAG
2 4 Parameter Size UINT32
3 4 Return Code TPM_RESULT
4 . . . n . . . Payload (opt.) . . .
Table 2.3: Components of a TPM-Response [30]
tion via a secure channel. For this, a command validation pro-
tocol is required for the authorization of the caller and for
ensuring the integrity of the authenticated channel and thus
the transmitted messages. The TCG specifies two essential com-
mand validation protocols, as described in the sequel, which
utilize an implementation of the HMAC [8].
oiap
The Object Independent Authorization Protocol (OIAP) al-
lows the development of a communication channel, wherein
the generated random number (nonce) may be utilized for
accessing all the TPM managed objects such as the man-
aged keys. The channel is valid indefinitely unless it is
terminated by the user or by the TPM. The corresponding
command for this protocol is the TPM_OIAP.
osap
In contrast, the Object Specific Authorization Protocol (OSAP)
allows the development of a communication channel, where
the generated nonce may be utilized for accessing only
a single TPM managed object. The nonce authorizes the
subject to execute several commands that target a single
object. The advantage is that for operations on the object
only once a password must be specified. The one-time
password can be optionally used to encrypt the transmit-
ted messages. The corresponding command for this pro-
tocol is the TPM_OSAP.
Although most TPM commands allow both command-validation
protocols, OIAP is preferable because it creates a session for au-
thorization of multiple objects. However, OSAP must be used
when authorization data (e.g., passwords that are utilized for
key management) is to be reset. These protocols initiate a rolling-
nonces scheme such that at every step of the protocol, both the
user and the TPM reference previously sent nonces and intro-
duce a new nonce. Nonces newly introduced by the user are
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User TPM
TPM_OIAP ( )
ah,ne
TPM_Command (ah, ev,no, . . .) , hmacad(ev) (ne,no, . . .)
. . . ,ne ′, hmacad(ev) (ne ′,no, . . .)
Figure 2.5: OIAP[30]
denoted as odd and those introduced by the TPM are denoted
as even. The generalized operation of OIAP and OSAP protocols
is depicted in Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6, respectively.
To establish a communication channel, the user executes the
TPM_OIAP command to the TPM with no additional parame-
ters. In response, the TPM sends a authhandle, ah, back as the
identification of the session and the first nonce ne. A subse-
quent TPM-command from the user refers to an entity (an ob-
ject) with identity ev and the session that is identified by ah. At
the same time the new nonce no is introduced and the autho-
rization is performed via the HMAC computation on the two
exchanged nonces ne and no. The authorization data ad (ev)
serves as the key for the HMAC computation. In response, the
TPM provides a new nonce ne ′ and the outcome of the HMAC
over the last and current nonces. Further communication in the
session is carried out by a new nonce and the created HMAC
over the last and current nonces (i.e., rolling-nonces). Similar to
OIAP, the OSAP also includes a rolling-nonces scheme. However,
the key for the HMAC computation for the communication will
be calculated as a session key S, which is again an HMAC cal-
culation using the key ad (ev) with previously exchanged OSAP
nonces.
Both OIAP and OSAP protocols are vulnerable to off-line dic-
tionary and impersonation attacks, as shown in [25]. Thus, it
is suggested by the TCG that these protocols may be replaced
or supplemented by a new protocol, referred to as Session Key
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User TPM
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TPM_Command (ah, ev,no, . . .) , hmacS (ne,no, . . .)
. . . ,ne ′, hmacS (ne ′,no, . . .)
Figure 2.6: OSAP[30]
Authorization Protocol (SKAP), which is proposed by Chen et al.
in [26]. In addition to the above protocols, there exist another
form of access control which is the verification of physical ac-
cess (physical proof of presence) on the system. This requires,
at system start-up, an interaction must take place with the plat-
form in order to execute a secure command. For this, the TCG
provides two options: First, a corresponding control signal can
be applied to the TPM chip, which is set by a special key com-
bination or a jumper on the motherboard. Secondly, a partic-
ular TPM-command (such as TSC_PhysicalPresence), signaled by
a software component that produces physical presence request.
In the latter case, the component must have previously inter-
acted with the user, and the TCG recommends this implementa-
tion as part of the CRTM.
2.5 threats to the tpm and their implications
For the purpose of analyzing the effect of cryptographic attacks
on the TPM security functions, a 4-layer abstraction model for
trusted computing is introduced as depicted in Figure 2.7.
• The Security Function Layer (SFL) accommodates the pre-
viously described TPM security functions and represents
the most abstract view. Trusted computing also specifies
several auxiliary security functions which are required for
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Security Function Layer (SFL)
Measurement, Attestation,
Binding, Sealing
Security Service Layer (SSL)
Authentication, Providing/Deleting
Ownership,
Key Management, Key Generation, ...
TPM Command Layer (TCL)
TPM_TakeOwnership, TPM_OIAP, TPM_Sign,
TPM_CreateWrapKey, TPM_Bind, TPM_Seal,
...
TPM Hardware Layer (THL)
Cryptographic Engines
SHA1, RSA, HMAC
Figure 2.7: Layered Abstraction Model for Trusted Computing[11]
correct and secure usage of the TPM. Actions to take own-
ership, to delete an owner, and to authenticate the TPM
commands are examples of these functions which we re-
fer to as security services. These services are accommo-
dated on a dedicated layer called the Security Service
Layer (SSL).
• The security services are accessed using commands such
as TPM_Seal, TPM_Bind, TPM_Sign, and others. Upon
its reception, the command is verified, decoded, and ex-
ecuted with the aid of the cryptographic engines as far as
needed. The commands are closely related to the under-
lying architecture. Therefore, they are settled on the TPM
Command Layer (TCL), which directly precedes the TPM
Hardware Layer (THL).
• The THL represents the TPM architecture itself, which in-
cludes all the cryptographic engines and corresponding
protocols. Note that THL, in this context, is simplified and
should refer to the underlying hardware/software archi-
tecture.
Thus, a compromise in one of the cryptographic engines of
the TPM would affect all the layers in the layered abstraction
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Threat Affected Compo-
nents and Func-
tions
Countermeasure
Side-Channel
attacks on RSA
RSA, keygen.,
Volatile and Non-
Volatile Memory
Side-Channel
aware RSA Imple-
mentation
Weak RSA Imple-
mentation
RSA, keygen.,
Volatile and Non-
Volatile Memory
RSA with longer
key
Broken RSA RSA, keygen.,
Volatile and Non-
Volatile Memory
Non RSA solution
Broken RSA Key
Generator
EK, SRK, Key Hier-
archy
New Key Genera-
tor
Broken SHA-1 PCRs, Attestation,
TPM_SHA1 com-
mands
New Hash func-
tion
Side-Channel
attacks on HMAC
Secret Key, User_
Auth_Data, In-
tegrity
Side-Channel
aware HMAC
Implementation
Broken HMAC User_Auth_Data,
Integrity
New HMAC
Side-Channel
attacks on RNG
Random Num-
bers, keygen.,
Nonces
New RNG
Insecure Com-
munication Inter-
face (LPC)
Keys, PCRs Secure Communi-
cation Interface &
Protocols
Broken Firmware
(ROM)
All
TPM_Commands
New Firmware
Table 2.4: Threats and Necessary Countermeasures[64]
model. In this regard, Table 2.4 gives an overview of the indi-
vidual threats a TPM has to deal with, the affected components,
and the countermeasures to the posed threats [64]. With refer-
ence to the Table 2.4 and Table 2.1, it is clear that a compro-
mised cryptographic engine would affect the security functions
provided by the TPM. Thus, there is a necessity to address the is-
sue of broken/compromised/weakened cryptographic engines
on the TPM. For this, a novel concept, referred to as STC, is pro-
posed in this thesis. Utilizing this concept, a novel architecture,
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referred to as STPM, which provides a flexible and secure up-
date of the cryptographic engines on it when they are compro-
mised, is designed. The concept of STC and the corresponding
STPM architecture are illustrated in the next chapter.
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3
S U S T A I N A B L E T R U S T E D C O M P U T I N G
The main goal of this thesis is to provide a novel architecture,
i.e., the STPM for the user, as depicted in Figure 3.1 (high level
view), which supports a flexible and secure update of crypto-
graphic engines on it. This depicted architecture, in contrast to
the conventional TPM architecture depicted in Figure 1.4, com-
prises of updatable cryptographic engines i.e., the Key Generator,
RSA, SHA-1, HMAC, and RNG may be replaced with new uncom-
promised engines in case of their compromise [39]. With such
an architecture, the user is provided with an uninterrupted
availability of the TPM security functionalities even if one of the
cryptographic engines on it, is compromised. This flexibility is
achieved by an on-the-fly update of the compromised engine
with a new uncompromised engine. Further, the user can load
the STPM with side-channel resistant or quantum computer re-
sistant cryptographic engines to avoid the related attacks and
thus make the device more secure.
This chapter explains about the requirements and specifica-
tions for designing the novel STPM architecture followed by an
illustration of the proposed architecture itself. Additionally, a
description of the update procedure is given, utilizing which
the compromised cryptographic engines on the proposed STPM
architecture are updated with new ones. Furthermore, an illus-
tration about the significant task of re-establishing the trust in
the system after an engine update is provided at the end.
The need for the STPM may arise because of one or more of
the following reasons:
• A compromised cryptographic engine on a TPM leads to
a compromise in security functionalities provided by it.
One solution could be to turn-off the TPM completely but
this may not be desired by the user.
• There may be implementation shortcomings crept in the
TPM during its manufacture, which cannot be changed
any more due to its current design (Application Specific
Integrated Circuit (ASIC)), after its manufacture and de-
ployment.
41
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Figure 3.1: Proposed STPM Architecture
• Replacing a compromised TPM every time with a new one
is not economically feasible considering the scale of its
deployment in the market.
• Though hard-wiring of cryptographic engines into the
TPM is regarded as a security feature, so far, this approach
is useless with the new developments in cryptanalysis
techniques and emergence of novel powerful computer
systems such as quantum computers.
Considering that the current trust anchors are unable to ad-
dress these new challenges and does not guarantee security
against attacks, there is a need for designing a new TPM ar-
chitecture. However, before delving into the architectural and
functional details of the STPM, we first describe the update pro-
cedure at an abstract level. The update procedure of the STPM
as a whole represents a distributed system comprising of an up-
date server (a computer) with new cryptographic algorithms, a
host computer (PC) with an embedded STPM, communication
between the update server and the host, and the internal com-
munication between the components of the STPM, as depicted
in Figure 3.2. To perform an update and to provide the TPM
functionalities, the STPM holds an update algorithm component
and a component for executing the TPM commands respectively.
Further, it consists of the locations themselves for loading the
new cryptographic engines by the update algorithm.
The server communicates with the PC over an external com-
munication channel (e.g., over the Internet) as in a conventional
server-client system. This communication is secured utilizing
a Public Key Cryptography (PKC) mechanism for authenticity
verification of the entities involved and the integrity verifica-
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Figure 3.2: System Level View of the STPM Update Procedure
tion of data being exchanged. The received update data by the
host is converted into an update command by the processor of
the host PC and is then transferred to the STPM which further
processes it utilizing its internal components before configur-
ing the designated locations on it. Later an acknowledgement
about the status of the update is sent back to the update server
by the host. However, a detailed discussion about all these steps
is presented later in the chapter.
3.1 fundamental architectural requirements for
stpm design
To simultaneously support an update of the cryptographic algo-
rithm and to execute the commands, the STPM architecture must
contain both static (non-updatable) and reconfigurable (updat-
able) regions on it. The static region contains an execution en-
gine which has to run un-interruptedly for executing the TPM
commands and the reconfigurable region holds the locations
for updatable cryptographic engines of the STPM, to be loaded
by the update algorithm. This update algorithm must also be
located in the static region of the STPM. In addition to requir-
ing the updatability feature, the STPM architecture must fulfill
memory (storage), interface (bus), and other requirements as
detailed below.
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With reference to the conventional TPM architecture (c.f. Fig-
ure 1.4), it is clear that a Non-Volatile Memory (NVM) is re-
quired to store sensitive cryptographic data i.e., EK, SRK, and
the platform certificates persistently. However, such a memory
is not inherently available with STPM, thus it must contain an
external NVM to store this data. Further, the NVM in our case
should be programmable to support the loading of new keys in
case of an asymmetric engine update i.e., RSA by Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC), which mandates the replacement of old
platform keys in case of compromise. There exist such memo-
ries (e.g., Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory (EPROM),
Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory (EEP-
ROM), and Flash) already in the market, which may be utilized.
Additionally, this NVM has to be large enough to hold the keys
for cryptographic operations to be performed by the update al-
gorithm of the STPM. These keys together with the STPM crypto-
graphic keys are programmed into this NVM by the STPM man-
ufacturer during its manufacture. Also, a re-writable memory
is needed to store the hash values representing the system state
and the bitfiles for the static/dynamic regions, which may be ac-
complished by utilizing a programmable Flash. A bus (such as
Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI)) external to the microcontroller
is required for accessing the content inside the NVM and the
Flash. These memories are attached to this bus as peripheral
components and are interfaced through corresponding mem-
ory controllers. Furthermore, an interface (bus communication)
between the PC and the STPM itself is required, as done by LPC
bus. Additionally, as a security requirement the communica-
tion between the NVM and the STPM must be protected against
an unauthorized access, to avoid the compromise of the keys
inside it and there by loss of all the data secured by them.
3.2 state of the art
An investigation has been done, as illustrated below, to find
out the availability of suitable platform in the market which
supports these fundamental requirements of the STPM.
Though structured-ASICs with both static and reconfigurable
parts seem to be a solution, they are only mask programmable,
an operation which can only be performed by the chip manu-
facturer [100]. With regard to the above statement, an FPGA sup-
porting the PR feature (c.f. 4.2) seems to be a well-suited plat-
form for the deployment of updatable TPMs. However, major-
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ity of the current Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) based
FPGAs do not support an on-board NVM yet, as required by the
TPM for storing sensitive cryptographic data such as EK, SRK,
and other certificates. Some FPGAs, such as the Spartan-3AN
family from Xilinx, contain an on-chip non-volatile Flash mem-
ory to keep the configuration data [106]. Such FPGAs, however,
belong to the low-price class and do not support PR, a feature
required for providing static and reconfigurable parts simulta-
neously in the FPGA.
The high-end Virtex-6 FPGA from Xilinx has an on-chip bit-
stream HMAC algorithm implemented in hardware [29]. When
used, this provides both the integrity and the authenticity ver-
ification of the incoming bitstream before loading it onto the
device. However, these devices are volatile in nature and do
not provide the required NVM for the design of STPM. The other
possible platform may be the Nextreme from eASIC, a family
of new ASIC devices, which combines an FPGA like logic cell,
called an eCell, with single customizable via routing [35]. In
contrast, a hybrid ASIC/FPGA was proposed jointly by IBM and
Xilinx [110]. This design is an incorporation of the FPGA cores
into the ASIC which allows the programmable circuitry to en-
able a single physical chip design to satisfy several different
applications. These architectures are also not suitable for the
STPM design as they too lack one or the other aforementioned
required features.
Meanwhile, there exist some Flash-based FPGAs, such as SoC
FPGAs from Microsemi. The advantage with the Flash-based
FPGAs is that the configuration data is not lost even after power-
off of the device. Furthermore, the latest device from this series,
referred to as SmartFusion2, is capable of providing robust de-
sign security [4]. This device supports the features such as a
non-deterministic RNG, a set of cryptographic algorithms ( i.e.,
ECC, Secure Hash Algorithm-2 (SHA-2), AES, and HMAC) and an
SRAM based Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) in addition to
others. Utilizing these, an architecture may be designed that
is secure against threats such as cloning, counterfeiting, and
tampering. Further, it provides security functionalities such as
integrity and authenticity verification, which are required for a
secure update of cryptographic algorithms on the STPM.
However, the Flash-based FPGAs such as the SmartFusion2 are
not in common use yet, in contrast to the SRAM based FPGAs.
This is because the latter have high logic density resulting in
higher capacities and higher performance when compared to
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the former. Furthermore, the Flash-based FPGAs require addi-
tional processing steps above a basic Complementary Metal
Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS) process and thus resulting in a
lag in the CMOS process. In specific, the Microsemi Flash-based
FPGAs are manufactured at 65 nm while the Xilinx SRAM based
FPGAs at 40 nm thus the latter technology yielding in a larger
and cheaper devices. Additionally, the integration of additional
features as done in SmartFusion2, at the end leads to a very com-
plex design. For these reasons, an SRAM based FPGA supporting
the PR feature is utilized to design the STPM in this work.
In the following we detail some existing approaches in the
literature to build trusted platforms based on an FPGA.
The rise in the usage of FPGAs in building embedded systems
has led to a mandatory requirement to protect the IP in such sys-
tems. In this context, the authors, Eisenbarth et al. in [36], have
tried to extend the FPGAs with the TC functionalities so that a
reconfigurable application is bound to the underlying TPM and
even to bind any higher layer software to the whole architecture.
For this, the TPM, stored as a bitstream in the external memory,
is loaded onto the FPGA at start-up and subsequently store its
cryptographic measurement in a register for later use. Conse-
quently all the loaded software applications on the FPGA are
integrity measured by the activated TPM before their execution
on the device. The loading of the TPM as a bitstream provides
the flexibility and scalability in update of the TPM functional-
ities, in particular the hardware-based cryptographic engines
and the accelerators. However, the proposed work only points
out the feasible implementation options and associated chal-
lenges but does not provide a concrete implementation of the
proposed architecture yet. Further, the authors do not discuss
about the measures to be taken, after an update of TPM func-
tionality, in order to re-establish the trust in the system.
Further, Glas et al. have proposed a method for mapping the
TPM specification to the embedded systems [46]. They built a
trusted embedded platform based on an FPGA that addition-
ally supports the dynamic partial reconfiguration feature. For
this purpose, they attached an external block, with an off-the-
shelf TPM, to the system and made few modifications to the
interface between the system and this external block. Thus, the
main goal of this work is to provide a secure dynamic partial
reconfiguration of the FPGA utilizing the TC features. In another
work, Ekberg et al. have proposed a mobile system that utilizes
the trusted computing concepts, referred to as Mobile Trusted
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Figure 3.3: Update Environment
Module (MTM), as detailed in [37]. In here, the task of MTM is
to provide TPM like features to the multiple stake holders, i.e.,
application provider, user, and network provider, in a mobile
computing system. A new architecture for the TPM that utilizes
a reduced trust boundary is proposed by Kursawe et al. in [60].
This architecture is much smaller and simpler implementation
without sacrificing security gains from a classical TPM design.
However, to the best of our knowledge, none of the above ap-
proaches addresses the issue of updating a compromised cryp-
tographic engine on the TPM and re-establishing the trust in the
system after its update.
3.3 adversarial model
As mentioned before the goal of the STPM architecture is not just
to achieve an update of the cryptographic engine by the update
algorithm but also to perform this update securely. Thus, we
consider an adversarial model for the update procedure and
evaluate the security of the STPM against an adversary. During
the STPM update, two parties are involved: the STPM residing in
a computer system and the update server maintaining the bit-
file library for new cryptographic engines, as depicted in Fig-
ure 3.3. The computer system (PC) embeds the STPM onto its
motherboard as in the case with a conventional TPM. This PC is
assumed to be part of an enterprise environment and is admin-
istered by the dedicated staff. It is assumed that the STPM itself
trusts the PC else additional security concerns will arise, which
are out of scope here. The update server delivers the new cryp-
tographic engines to be loaded onto the STPM over an insecure
network. Thus, the API! (API!) corresponding to the network
must be updated to provide a secure transfer of the data. Fur-
ther, it is administered by the STPM manufacturer, who initiates
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and provides all the update services. Additionally, the update
server is assumed to be run in a secure environment i.e., at-
tacks on the server itself, such as denial-of-service attack, are
not considered in this thesis.
A successful attack on a cryptographic engine on the STPM is
detected only by the update server. This scenario is similar to
a virus attack on the user system, in which an user reacts only
after he comes to know about the attack. With reference to the
taxonomy of attacks given by Popp [75], some of the possible
attack scenarios, during the update of STPM, are explained in
the following.
The adversary in the considered model is an active eaves-
dropper i.e., someone who first taps the communication line to
obtain messages and then tries everything in order to discover
the plain text [34]. More precisely, the adversary may obtain
any message passing through the channel, an attack referred
to as cloning by interception. This attack may lead to copying
of the bitfile data being transferred from the update server. An
example case of cloning is depicted in Figure 3.4. In here, two
users (User1 and User2) are exchanging messages over a com-
munication channel, which is intercepted by an unauthorized
observer i.e., the malware, to read the messages and store them
for later use [53].
The adversary can perform replay attacks i.e., send false ma-
terial utilizing the data he obtained during the interception of
the channel. Replay attacks are those in which the intercepted
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Figure 3.5: Replay Attack
data or credentials from the previous session are retransmitted
by the attacker to fraudulently authenticate to one of the users.
Such a scenario is depicted in Figure 3.5. The malware records
the previous transmissions between user1 and user2 to authen-
ticate itself to the user2 later. In our case, User1 and User2 may
refer to STPM and update server respectively.
The other kind of possible attack is a malicious update of
the STPM by a man-in-the-middle attack (c.f.. Figure 3.6). Here
in, the attacker deceives the STPM to authenticate himself to be
the update server or deceive the update server to authenticate
himself to be the STPM. In the former case, the attacker may
load malicious configuration data onto the STPM to destroy its
functionality and in the latter he would know the content of
the update data. The aforementioned attacks are categorized
as classical cryptanalysis attacks, which can be avoided by the
proposed update algorithm as detailed later in this thesis.
There exist another group of attacks referred to as implemen-
tation attacks such as side-channel attacks, reverse engineering,
and others. The side-channel attacks make use of the power
consumption measurements of the device, while performing
certain functionality, to extract the secret data. In reverse engi-
neering, the attacker tries to reconstruct the functional descrip-
tion in the form of netlists from the initial configuration data.
In case of a physical attack, the adversary physically possesses
the device and may destroy it to extract secrets from it.
However, the attacker in the considered model here is as-
sumed to be able to perform only classical cryptanalytic attacks
and not the implementation attacks. Furthermore, this assump-
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Figure 3.6: Man-In-The-Middle Attack
tion complies with the TCG specification [89], which states that
the physical and the implementation attacks on the TPM during
shipping and after deployment are not considered.
3.4 stpm architectural specifications
This section deals with determining necessary architectural spec-
ifications for the STPM design in addition to the aforementioned
fundamental design requirements in Section 3.1. These spec-
ifications in turn are dependent on the functional and non-
functional requirements arising when replacing the compro-
mised cryptographic algorithms on the STPM and later re-establishing
the trust in the system. For this, two fundamental cryptographic
algorithms on the STPM i.e., SHA-1 and RSA are considered. The
functional and non-functional requirements of the updates may
be derived based on the resulting implications when these al-
gorithms are compromised, as explained in the sequel.
3.4.1 Compromised SHA-1
Compromised SHA-1 has the following implications on the sys-
tem (denoted as I):
• I1: The computed platform state, i.e., the integrity mea-
surements stored inside the PCRs, are no more valid.
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• I2: The signatures generated (utilizing SHA-1) during re-
mote attestation may be forged.
• I3: The data sealed to the platform can no more be un-
sealed.
• I4: Command authorization by HMAC is incorrect because
it utilizes the same SHA-1 algorithm.
Based on these implications, following functional (denoted as
FR) and non-functional requirements (denoted as NFR) arise:
• FR1: The update of SHA-1 with a new hash algorithm, for
example SHA-2. Thus, the update of the compromised al-
gorithm by a new one itself is the first and foremost func-
tional requirement.
• FR2: To handle I1, a new platform state has to be com-
puted with new hash algorithm.
• FR3: To handle I2, the signatures have to be recomputed
with new hash algorithm.
• FR4: To handle I3, unsealing the sealed data with old hash
engine and then sealing it to the new hash engine is re-
quired.
• FR5: To handle I4, the HMAC should be configured to
make use of the new hash engine.
3.4.2 Compromised RSA
Compromised RSA has the following implications:
• I1: The complete key hierarchy of the TPM is compro-
mised.
• I2: The signatures generated (utilizing RSA) during remote
attestation may be forged.
• I3: The bound and sealed data is lost because the keys
utilized for these operations are the RSA generated asym-
metric keys.
• I4: The cryptographic engines of the TPM such as the key
generator, asymmetric encryption/decryption engine that
rely on RSA are no more trustworthy.
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Based on these implications, the following functional require-
ments arise:
• FR1: The update of RSA with a new asymmetric algorithm
such as ECC.
• FR2: To handle I1, a completely new TPM key hierarchy is
required to be built.
• FR3: To handle I2, the signatures have to be recomputed
with new asymmetric algorithm.
• FR4: The bound/sealed data is already lost and can not be
recovered, thus only the new data can be bound/sealed
with a new asymmetric engine.
• FR5: To handle I4, the firmware should be updated to exe-
cute the related commands utilizing the new asymmetric
engine.
However, the non-functional requirements are common for
both SHA-1 and RSA update and may be generalized as follows:
• NFR1: The update procedure should be secure.
• NFR2: The update should be performed very rapidly.
• NFR3: A de-allocation of the resources that are allocated
to the previous engine should be done.
• NFR4: Over-provisioning of the resources for the new en-
gine must be handled.
• NFR5: The overall STPM architecture design must be eco-
nomical (i.e., cost-aware).
3.5 generic stpm architecture
Based on the aforementioned fundamental architectural require-
ments, functional, and non-functional requirements, a generic
STPM architecture as depicted in Figure 3.7 is proposed, which
resembles the chip design suggested in [15].
The static region contains an execution engine (a microcon-
troller) for executing the TCG specific commands given to the
STPM by the CPU of the system. These commands, which arrive
over the LPC bus (as in current TPM standard) are received by
the execution engine over its I/O block [51]. These commands
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Figure 3.7: Generic Architecture of STPM
are then executed by the processor of the execution engine to
provide the required security functionalities such as integrity
measurement, remote attestation, binding, and sealing.
In contrast, the dynamic region holds locations for the up-
datable cryptographic engines of the STPM, to be loaded by the
update algorithm through the configuration port. The update
algorithm and the configuration port are both in the static re-
gion. The new cryptographic engines arrive as an update data
from an update server to the CPU of the system over an external
communication channel and through to the execution engine of
STPM over the LPC bus. Before loading the new engines, they are
authenticity verified and decrypted by the update algorithm.
Additionally, the static region contains an NVM for storing the
sensitive cryptographic keys and data. This NVM is accessed by
both execution engine and update algorithm through a memory
controller (Memory Ctlr.) interface. In specific, the NVM stores
the cryptographic keys required for the operations to be per-
formed by these two components. Further, it can be seen that
the BIOS is also attached to the same LPC bus to which the STPM
is connected, thus complying to the standard TCG specified TPM
design.
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Figure 3.8: Input and Output Message Blocks of Update Command
In the following, a detailed description is given about how
the generic STPM architecture meets the aforementioned spec-
ifications. While doing so, further working details of the indi-
vidual components of both static and dynamic region are also
given.
To update the compromised algorithm with a new algorithm,
the STPM architecture should be equipped with an update algo-
rithm. Further, this functional requirement of having an update
algorithm is common for both SHA-1 and RSA engine update.
Thus, to fulfill the requirement of an algorithm update, one
needs update data, an update command, and then the process-
ing of this update command by the execution engine, which in
turn utilizes the update algorithm.
The update data comprises of an encrypted new cryptographic
engine and an attached authorization data (c.f. Section 3.5.2).
The update command comprises of message blocks (input and
output) similar to a conventional TPM command (e.g., TPM_OIAP
command) as depicted in Figure 3.8.
The input message block contains the authorization tag, the
parameter size, the command code, and the payload. The au-
thorization tag (2 bytes) indicates whether the command has to
be authorized or not before its execution. A command is said
to be authorized when it provides the 160-bit long hash rep-
resentation of the owner password, referred to as Auth_Secret,
before its execution by the TPM. The owner password is gener-
ated while taking ownership of the TPM, which is encrypted by
the public part of EK and is stored inside the NVM of the TPM.
The parameter size (4 bytes) specifies the total number of
bytes that make up the command and the command code (4
bytes) specifies the command to which it is actually referring
to. The payload (variable in size), depending on the command
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Figure 3.9: Execution Engine of STPM
type may refer to one or more parameters of various lengths
such as handles, nonces, hashes, and data. However, in our
case the payload is the aforementioned update data. The out-
put message block is identical to input message block except
that the return code is now a status signal indicating the suc-
cessful or failed execution of the command.
Once the update command with update data is available at
the STPM’s execution engine, the command is executed by its
processor, and the update data is fed to the update algorithm.
The internal details of the execution engine and the update al-
gorithm are described in sequel.
3.5.1 Execution Engine
One significant component in the static region of the STPM is
the execution engine which provides the required control flow
and the corresponding command execution similar to a con-
ventional TPM. In its design, the execution engine of the STPM
is a microcontroller system, which comprises of several inter-
nal components such as a processor, RAM, ROM, I/O ports, and
an internal local bus connecting all these components as de-
picted in Figure 3.9. Though the most commonly used micro-
controllers are the 8-bit, there also exist 16 and 32 bit microcon-
trollers in the market and the user may select the one based on
his specific requirements. The bit width (8, 16, and 32) here in-
dicates the data width, which the microcontroller, in specific its
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processor, can perform operations on, in a single clock cycle. In
our case, we also utilize an 8-bit microcontroller inside the STPM
because it has to interface with the LPC bus for command and
data transfer. With regard to this, the I/O read and I/O write
cycles of the LPC bus also support a data size of 1 byte (8-bits),
which again complies to the standard TCG specifications.
Further, in case of STPM design, the ”update command" and
corresponding ”program code" should also be included in the
standard command set and the ROM respectively. For the com-
mand execution, the processor utilizes the program code (i.e.,
TCG firmware) stored inside the ROM and the working memory
RAM, which are attached to the processor local bus, and are ac-
cessed through the provided address and data lines to the pro-
cessor. Further, the integrated ROM inside the microcontroller
should be programmable (e.g., EPROM or EEPROM) because it
needs to be updated to support new TPM commands in case of
an engine update or for adding additional features to the STPM.
The I/O block in the execution engine is a set of programmable
input/output ports. These ports can be thought of as memory
cells or registers that are connected to the processor through
the data bus and further to the outside world (to the CPU of the
system and other peripherals) via pins on the side of the mi-
crocontroller. For example, the data from the CPU, such as the
STPM command or other data that propagate over the LPC bus
are fed to the STPM, in specific to the I/O block, which in turn is
fed to the processor of the microcontroller through its data bus
for further processing.
There exists an additional essential component inside the exe-
cution engine i.e., the embedded Flash memory. This memory is
required to store the configuration data, for loading into the dy-
namic region of the STPM, because when the STPM is switched-
off, the dynamic region loses its content because of its volatile
nature. Further, this component stores the STPM computed plat-
form state (i.e., the PCR values). The processor accesses this em-
bedded Flash memory through a latch buffer comprising of two
latches and a transceiver. A microcontroller with such a mem-
ory design is already available in the literature [93].
3.5.2 Update Algorithm
The update algorithm in our case is a hardware module, as de-
picted in Figure 3.10, with the cryptographic blocks for encryp-
tion, decryption, and authentication operations. Further, the up-
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Figure 3.10: Internal Components of the Update Algorithm
date procedure should be simple in design flow and must com-
ply to the TCG standard specifications in terms of security it
provides, which is achieved by the proposed algorithm as de-
tailed in the sequel. Whereas the encryption and decryption
operations utilize the AES block, the authentication utilizes the
AES-Hash and AES-HMAC (referred to as Cipher-based Message
Authentication Code (CMAC)) blocks. Thus, such a hardware
module not only is easy to design but also consumes few com-
putational resources of the underlying platform because it re-
utilizes the same base block, i.e., AES, for all its operations.
The hardware module additionally contains a controller (a
state machine), for performing the aforementioned cryptographic
operations, and a memory block acting as a data buffer for tem-
porary storage of incoming and outgoing data. The hardware
module, in specific its controller, accesses the configuration port
in the static logic through its I/O block. This configuration port
is utilized for loading the new cryptographic engines into the
dynamic region of the STPM.
The update algorithm is embedded in the static region of the
STPM and communicates with the STPM processor over the SPI
bus (Figure 3.7). The SPI is an 8-bit or more synchronous serial
interface providing a master-slave relationship [78]. In our case,
the master being the STPM processor and the update algorithm
being the slave. This update algorithm is also used in another
work for performing a secure and an authenticated update of
the device IP in an FPGA-based embedded system [40].
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As mentioned earlier, the update algorithm must assure both
secure and timely loading of the new cryptographic engines
on to the STPM from the update server, thus satisfying the first
and second non-functional requirements. To achieve this, the
update process should be secure against attackers and should
be performed in a short time. It is clear that an authenticated
communication between the update server and the host guaran-
tees a secure transfer of update data. For this purpose, a special
data format is specified for the update data, denoted as UDATA,
originating from the server.
Following is a notation introduced before defining the update
data:
config The configuration file for the new engine
k Previously exchanged symmetric encryp-
tion key for IP protection
E(k,M) Symmetric encryption of messageMwith
key k
kcmac Key used for generating the CMAC
CMAC(kcmac,M) CMAC of message M computed with key
kcmac
Using this notation, the update data is defined as:
UDATA ⇔ (E(k, config)||CMAC((kcmac,E(k, config)))) (3.1)
From the above definition, it can be seen that the update data
consists of encrypted configuration for the new engine and the
element for verifying its authenticity (i.e., an attached CMAC
[69] of the encrypted data). The CMAC algorithm operates iden-
tical to an HMAC algorithm, except for the utilized MAC to gen-
erate the output. The generated MAC in the latter is based on
a conventional hash algorithm (e.g., SHA-1) whereas in the for-
mer it is based on a block cipher based hash algorithm (e.g.,
AES-Hash).
Upon receiving the update data at host, it is first converted
into an update command and is then transferred to the STPM,
in specific to its execution engine. Then the execution engine
interprets the update command and sends the payload (i.e., the
update data) part of it to the update algorithm over the SPI bus
for authentication and decryption operations. To perform these
operations, the received data is first stored in the temporary
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Algorithm 1 Cryptographic Engine Update Algorithm
Require: UDATA, symmetric key k, cmac key kcmac
1: Load UDATA from server into the host
2: Send the update command to the STPM
3: Compute CMAC((kcmac,E(k, config))) and compare with
attached CMAC
4: if Comparison result is true then
5: Decrypt E(k, config)
6: Configure STPM with config
7: Activate new engine
8: return Update_complete.
9: else
10: Reject data and send failed command
11: return Update_failed.
12: end if
memory (i.e., memory block of the update algorithm) and is fed
to the authentication block (AES-HMAC) in 128-bit blocks. This
memory is large enough to hold the complete payload and to
store the intermediately computed CMAC for later comparison.
Once the complete CMAC on the encrypted data is available, it
is compared with attached CMAC in the payload. If the values
match, it implies that the authentication is successful i.e., the
update data comes from an authentic server, and thus the en-
crypted configuration data can further be decrypted. If the val-
ues do not match, it implies that the authentication has failed,
thus the data should be rejected and the update process should
be stopped by aborting the update command and returning a
failed command code.
Further actions that need to be taken based on the authenti-
cation result of the controller are as detailed below:
• Case 1: Authentication successful
The decrypted data is sent back to the STPM processor over
the same SPI interface for storing it in the embedded Flash
which is later required for configuring dynamic region of
the STPM on next start-up of the system. After storing a
copy of the configuration data in the Flash memory, it
is further programmed into the specific location in the
dynamic region by the controller of the update algorithm
through the configuration port. The status of successful
update command is acknowledged to the server via the
host system.
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Figure 3.11: Updatable Cryptographic Engines of the STPM
• Case2: Authentication fails
The rejected data is sent back to the STPM processor, which
in turn deletes the data from the system by standard data
deletion mechanisms. The status of failed update com-
mand is acknowledged to the server via the host system.
The procedure for loading a new cryptographic engine on to
the STPM is detailed in Algorithm 1. It can be seen from the
algorithm description that, for verifying the attached CMAC on
the update data, the STPM requires the storage of the CMAC
key, kcmac, in the NVM within the STPM. Further, to decrypt the
encrypted cryptographic engine, the STPM must be equipped
both with the symmetric cryptographic engine (AES) and the
corresponding symmetric key k. These keys are programmed
into the NVM of the STPM during its manufacture as mentioned
in Section 3.1.
3.5.3 Updatable Cryptographic Engines
The dynamic region of the STPM comprises of locations for up-
datable cryptographic engines as depicted in Figure 3.11. These
locations are reconfigurable to support an engine update in case
of a compromise.
These cryptographic engines are accessed by the processor of
the execution engine through the interface block (programmable
I/O and an interconnect bus) of the STPM architecture for exe-
cuting the various TPM commands. The processor of the micro-
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controller treats the dynamic logic as a large block of memory
(as in a Memory Mapped Input Output (MMIO) scheme) with
specific locations performing certain cryptographic operations
and accesses them over an interconnect bus as depicted in Fig-
ure 3.7. Though only a compromise of SHA-1, RSA, and their
dependents have been discussed till now, it can be seen that
RNG is also a part of updatable cryptographic engines block.
To summarize, the correct functioning of the STPM architec-
ture relies on a coordinated operation of all its three essen-
tial blocks (i.e., execution engine, update algorithm, and updat-
able cryptographic engines) and their inter connection and com-
munication (i.e., through buses and interfaces) along with the
other essential components (i.e., memories and keys). Further,
all these components of the STPM architecture are protected by
a secure package, referred to as security boundary in Figure 3.7,
to avoid any physical and implementation attacks on them.
3.6 stpm architecture analysis
Given the STPM architecture, the update server, and the defined
update algorithm, this section analyzes how the requirements
that raised due to compromised SHA-1 and RSA (as detailed in
Section 3.4.1 and Section 3.4.2 respectively) are met by the pro-
posed STPM architecture. Meeting these requirements is to re-
gain or re-establish the trust in the system because the TPM is
considered as the trust anchor of the system and thus a com-
promised engine on it implies a compromise of trust kept in
the system utilizing it.
The first functional requirement of the STPM architecture is
to perform the update of compromised SHA-1 and RSA engines
with correspondingly new uncompromised engines. This is achieved
by utilizing the aforementioned update algorithm as detailed in
Section 3.5.2. The other individual (SHA-1 and RSA) functional
requirements to be met by the proposed STPM architecture are
detailed in the following.
3.6.1 Regaining Trust after SHA-1 Engine Update
3.6.1.1 Integrity Measurement
Integrity measurement is a basic function to compute the hash
values to be stored in PCRs, which represent the current system
state. In the case of an hash engine update, this representation
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of the system state is no more valid, because it had been com-
puted with the old hash engine. This leads to an undefined rep-
resentation of the system state, where it cannot be determined
whether the system is in a trustworthy state or not. Even if
there are no changes in hardware or software, the current PCR
contents will differ from future values computed with the up-
dated hash engine. Also, due to the fact that the measurement
has been performed using the old hash engine, the PCR contents
are prone to collision attacks. However, after updating the hash
engine, the whole platform configuration is recomputed and
stored in the PCRs. Because most of the PCRs are not resettable,
the system has to be rebooted before the new measurements
can be considered as trustworthy. To indicate the trustworthi-
ness, the system state has again to be compared to the reference
values.
Further, the PCRs should now support the storage of hash val-
ues generated by new hash engine, which causes their size to
be changed. This is because the hash value computed by the
new engine, for example SHA-2, may be 224/256/384/512 bit
unlike the 160 bit hash generated by SHA-1. This implies that
the memory storing the PCR values should be flexible in size to
accommodate larger values. For this, the embedded Flash mem-
ory included inside the execution engine during the design of
the STPM should be large enough.
3.6.1.2 Remote Attestation
A trusted platform is able to attest the current system state to
any requester. Remote attestation is the only function, which is
able to directly distinguish between trustworthy and untrust-
worthy system states. Usually, the trusted system states are
stored in RMLs generated by the IT-department of the organi-
sation. In the case of an update of the hash engine, these RMLs
become invalid. Therefore, the reference list has to be recom-
puted by means of the updated hash engine. Thus, the contents
of the PCRs have to be re-evaluated in order to reflect the update
in the stored hash values with the new hash engine.
3.6.1.3 Binding
Binding is used to asymmetrically encrypt sensitive data with
keys, which are available on a specific TPM only. The binding
function can be considered to be independent of the trust some-
one puts into the system. Of course, the confidential data has
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to be protected properly for which the binding procedure itself
does not provide any measures to reflect the trustworthiness of
the current state. Therefore, the update of the hash engine does
not affect the binding function directly.
3.6.1.4 Sealing
Sealing uses the current system state to protect sensitive data. It
extends the binding operation by including the system state as
one of the parameter along with the data and the keys. Sealed
data can only be unsealed if the system is in the same state
as during the sealing procedure. After an update of the hash
engine the data cannot be unsealed, because the PCR content
has changed. To tackle this problem, a resealing process must
be performed as detailed below.
3.6.1.5 Data Resealing
Data resealing is necessary after a hash engine update to main-
tain the availability of sealed data. Data resealing of remote
data is necessary if the PCR values change, but the system is
still in a trusted state. This usually happens only when soft-
ware updates were performed because the software updates
do not modify the underlying hardware of the system. As the
sealing function relies on the content of PCRs, we propose a pro-
cedure to reseal data to the updated PCR values that represent
the current state of the system. To understand this procedure
we review the sealing protocol in brief.
reseal⇔ unseal(Hashold) + seal(Hashnew) (3.2)
Notation 3.2 shows that prior to sealing the data with the
new hash engine (Hashnew), it has to be unsealed first by us-
ing the outdated hash function (Hashold). However, after the
SHA-1 update, the PCRs contain the measurements of the system
state with the new hash engine. Therefore, to perform resealing,
the current system state has to be made available in both rep-
resentations computed by Hashold and Hashnew, respectively.
To achieve this, along with the two hash engines, two sets of
PCRs, are needed to store both representations (old and new)
of the system state. For this purpose, the STPM architecture fea-
tures the operation of two hash engines in parallel to store both
system states in the embedded Flash memory of the microcon-
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troller, and thus accelerate the resealing process. After a reboot
action, the resealing procedure is performed according to Equa-
tion 3.2.
The resealing operation being large to be performed inside
the STPM, it is done at the CPU of the system. For this, the CPU
must be provided with the corresponding PCRs and the sealing
key. The private part of the sealing key is determined by the
SRK of the STPM, which along with the sealed data and platform
state is sent to the CPU of the system over the LPC bus. Further,
the unsealing part of the resealing operation, should be done
before loading the STPM with the new hash engine because after
loading with new hash engine the old system state is no more
available.
Although the data resealing aspect has been considered by
Kühn et al. in [59], they concentrate mainly on the hardware
and software life cycle as commonly found in enterprises. Their
procedures assume that the system state is trustworthy even
after a software update, which does not cover the case of a hash
engine hardware update that affects the integrity measurement
process itself. Therefore, to cope with the update of components
of the TPM such as the hash engine, the procedures presented
in [59] are not applicable instead new dedicated measures as
described in this thesis are required.
3.6.1.6 HMAC
A TPM command is authenticated using the HMAC function and
one of the OSAP/OIAP protocols as specified by the TCG. Con-
sidering that the HMAC function uses the hash engine, it has to
be fitted to the new hash engine in the case of an update. This
adjustment is related to the update of the TCG firmware which
may be handled by the related command. In this regard, the
STPM_update command is an un-authorized command because
the compromised SHA-1 means that the HMAC function may no
more be used and the compromised RSA implies that the EK
is no more valid. However, secure communication to the STPM
can be continued using two different approaches. In the first ap-
proach, all new messages, which have an HMAC attached, have
to use the new hash function to create the authentication code.
Running sessions using OIAP or OSAP can be terminated, if the
hash function has been exchanged and the session has to be
reinitiated afterwards. However, the overhead introduced by
this procedure is tolerable because the algorithm update will
not happen too frequently.
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The second approach is to use the mode of operation intro-
duced by Bellare et al. in [19]. They presented a proof for the
usage of HMAC functions even though the hash engine loses its
collision resistance property. Therefore, running sessions can
still exploit the old hash engine, while newly initiated sessions
operate the updated hash engine. The authors in here prove
that, the HMAC is a Pseudo Random Function (PRF) under the
sole assumption that the compression function is a PRF. This re-
covers a proof based guarantee since no known attacks compro-
mise the pseudorandomness of the compression function. Fur-
ther, it also helps to explain the resistance-to-attack that HMAC
shows even when implemented with hash functions whose (weak)
collision resistance is compromised. They additionally show
that an even weaker-than-PRF condition on the compression
function, namely that it is a privacy-preserving MAC that is suf-
ficient to establish HMAC as a secure MAC, as long as the hash
function meets the very weak requirement of being computa-
tionally almost universal.
3.6.1.7 Signatures
Signatures are used during the remote attestation process to
attest the state of the system to a remote challenger. For this,
the PCR values are signed using the AIK and sent to the chal-
lenger for verification. In general, signature creation uses the
hash engine, as presented in [70], whereas collisions of the hash
engine directly translate to forgeries. However, in this case the
signatures are created using the mode of operation presented
in [49] and therefore are considered to be valid despite the fact
that the hash engine is not collision resistant. The authors in
here propose to use randomized hashing as the mode of op-
eration for hash functions intended for use with standard dig-
ital signatures and without necessitating any changes in the
internals of the underlying hash function (e.g., the Secure Hash
Algorithm (SHA) family) or in the signature algorithms (e.g.,
RSA or Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)). The goal is to free
practical digital signature schemes from their current reliance
on strong collision resistance by basing the security of these
schemes on significantly weaker properties of the underlying
hash function, thus providing a safety net in case the (current
or future) hash functions in use turn out to be less resilient
to collision search than initially thought. Even though the digi-
tal signatures are still valid using the above scheme, new mes-
sages should be signed using the new hash engine. The signa-
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tures have to carry some information showing the algorithm
that was used to create them, as done in X.509 [27] certificates.
Also, all certificates that are used during the boot sequence of
the system might have to be updated to fit the new signature al-
gorithm. Again these operations are related to the update of the
TCG firmware which may be handled by the related command.
3.6.2 Regaining Trust after RSA Engine Update
3.6.2.1 TPM Key Hierarchy
There exists a fixed key hierarchy in every TPM (regardless of
its manufacturer) with the fundamental asymmetric keys, i.e.,
EK and SRK. Utilizing these keys, the TPM internally generates
the additional keys required for various operations and stores
them outside of the TPM in a secure form. When transferring
keys from a TPM to an external memory, a key hierarchy is
established (c.f. Figure 2.3). The keys inside the hierarchy are
utilized to encrypt and decrypt the user data while performing
bind and seal operations. Before the compromise of the RSA,
the keys of the key hierarchy are the RSA keys. They all may
be compromised after the RSA compromise causing the loss of
all the data protected by those keys. Therefore, after replacing
RSA with ECC by the update, a completely new key hierarchy is
required to be composed.
Thus, building a new key hierarchy implies first generating
EK and SRK and later the lower level keys in the hierarchy. There
are two different methods to generate a new EK pair. One ap-
proach is to generate new key pair at the STPM manufacturer
side and then program it into the NVM of the STPM. For this,
the engine update like procedure may be deployed between the
manufacturer and the system with STPM. Another approach uti-
lizes a specific command provided in the TCG firmware for this
purpose. This command, referred to as TPM_CreateEndorsementKeyPair,
which when executed establishes a new public/private EK pair.
For this, it utilizes the asymmetric cryptographic engine and
the key generator along with the random number generator of
the STPM. Once the EK pair is generated, the SRK pair is gen-
erated utilizing the command TPM_TakeOwnership. Given the
availability of these two keys, the whole key hierarchy is estab-
lished subsequently. However, in our case we rely on the first
approach for loading the fundamental asymmetric key pair on
the STPM.
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3.6.2.2 Remote Attestation and Signatures
In the case of a compromised RSA engine, the signatures gener-
ated during the remote attestation process become invalid. This
is because, a digital signature is a private key based encryp-
tion of the hash computed on a message. Therefore, all these
signatures have to be recomputed by means of the updated
asymmetric engine, which generates a new private key.
3.6.2.3 Binding and Sealing
Once a weakness in RSA is discovered, all key material is ob-
solete along with the data encrypted by it. Therefore, the data,
which is bound or sealed to a platform, can not be recovered
securely because these operations have used the compromised
RSA keys. However, the new data can be protected by taking
advantage of the updated asymmetric engine and the new plat-
form state.
3.6.2.4 Recovery Strategy
To overcome the aforementioned problems due to compromised
RSA, a step-by-step procedure, as mentioned below, has to be
followed.
1. Check for an availability of back-up of the data in the
system. If not, the data must be restored before updating
the engine.
2. Perform an update of the compromised RSA engine with
a new asymmetric engine by utilizing the defined update
algorithm.
3. The EK is an asymmetric key which must be compatible
with the new asymmetric engine. Thus, there is a need to
load/generate (depending on the TPM vendor) a new EK.
Sign the new EK by a trusted party to indicate that a new
asymmetric engine has been loaded onto the STPM.
4. Take ownership of the system to generate a new SRK, which
is the root key of the TPM key hierarchy.
5. Generate a new key hierarchy utilizing the new SRK and
the new asymmetric engine.
6. Signatures must be generated utilizing the new asymmet-
ric engine for use in remote attestation procedure.
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7. Bind/Seal the new data with the new keys of the gen-
erated key hierarchy. Further, old data may be secured
utilizing the new keys.
In the following, the fulfillment of non-functional require-
ments (common for both SHA-1 and RSA engines) by the STPM
is detailed.
The overall time consumed for performing the update de-
pends on the individual time consumption by the intermedi-
ate steps during the update procedure. These steps include
transmission of update data from the update server to the PC,
through to the STPM, its authentication and decryption by the
update algorithm, and at the end configuration of the dynamic
region with the new cryptographic engine. Though the first
two steps depend on the communication medium (channel and
bus), the other steps make use of a lightweight symmetric cryp-
tographic engine (AES) and a fast configuration port (Internal
Configuration Access Port (ICAP)).
To cope with the over-provisioning of resources in the dy-
namic region, it must be not only sized sufficiently for the ini-
tial application, but enough unused resources must be left to
support future logic configurations. However, this is the criti-
cal design planning consideration which is the task of the STPM
architecture design team and may be supported by enhanced
Computer Aided Design (CAD) tools.
The process of combining the dynamic region with the static
region has both technical and economic advantages [110]. Tech-
nically, the solution offers a greater performance with lower
power dissipation. Further, by keeping static region to dynamic
region connections on the same die, valuable static I/O pins
are also conserved. Economically, the solution can be less ex-
pensive because the dynamic logic fabric does not require any
unique semiconductor processing above and beyond the base
static logic. In addition the cost of assembly, test, and packag-
ing of a second chip are also eliminated.
Utilizing the proposed generic STPM architecture as the base,
a proof-of-concept implementation of the STPM design along
with an update of compromised cryptographic engines on it, is
detailed in the next chapter.
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With the available description of the requirements and speci-
fications for the STPM architecture design, this chapter details
the proof-of-concept implementation of the STPM. In specific, it
deals with selecting the components available in the market to-
day and integrating them together to build an STPM architecture
such that the resulting design meets all possible requirements
mentioned in the previous chapter.
4.1 platform technology - fpga
Considering that the goal of the STPM architecture is to sup-
port an update of cryptographic algorithms on it, the underly-
ing platform must be reconfigurable. This is because, reconfig-
urability provides the flexibility of on-site programming and
re-programming without going through re-fabrication with a
modified design. Given this, FPGAs are one such group of de-
vices that offer the reconfigurability feature by loading different
configurations called bitstreams in their terminology. In the fol-
lowing architectural details of Xilinx FPGAs is given.
In its architecture, FPGA is a programmable semiconductor
device that is based around a matrix of Configurable Logic
Blocks (CLBs) connected via programmable interconnects as de-
picted in Figure 4.1 [85]. As opposed to an ASIC, where the
device is custom built for the particular design, FPGAs can be
programmed to the desired application or functionality require-
ments. The CLB, which forms the basic logic unit in an FPGA,
consists of a configurable switch matrix with 4 or 6 inputs
(Look-Up-Table (LUT)), some selection circuitry (Multiplexer (MUX)),
and flip-flops. A high level overview of the CLB with a 4-input
LUT, a single flip-flop, a MUX, clock (Clk), and reset (Rst) signal
is depicted in Figure 4.2. While the CLB provides the logic capa-
bility, flexible interconnect routing routes the signals between
CLBs and to/from the I/O. All the three components i.e., logic,
routing, and I/O in an FPGA are programmable.
It is the design software that makes the interconnect routing
task hidden to the user, thus significantly reducing design com-
plexity. Current FPGAs provide support for dozens of I/O stan-
69
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Figure 4.1: Architecture of an FPGA [85]
dards thus providing the ideal interface and flexibility in bridg-
ing the system interface. Special memory unit such as an em-
bedded block RAM is available in most FPGAs, which allows for
an on-chip storage in the design. Further, dedicated arithmetic
blocks such as Digital Signal Processors (DSPs) for fast math-
ematical computations and high performance microprocessor
embedded blocks are supported by some of the high-end FPGAs.
A digital clock management which acts as the clocking resource
for the design is also supported by the FPGAs. In this context,
the Virtex-5 FPGA platform [108] from Xilinx supporting pow-
erful features, such as PR (as detailed below), platform Flash
Programmable Read Only Memory (PROM), both high and low
speed interfaces, is utilized for a proof-of-concept implementa-
tion of the STPM design in this thesis.
4.2 partial reconfiguration (pr)
Partial reconfiguration is the feature supported by some of the
high-end FPGAs utilizing which it is possible to provide simul-
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taneous availability of both static and dynamic regions in the
device logic. Considering that this feature being the fundamen-
tal requirement in designing the STPM, details about it are given
in the sequel.
There is an analogy between the general-purpose processor’s
context switching and the PR of an FPGA i.e., the former being
the time multiplexing of software resources (programs) and the
latter being the time multiplexing of hardware resources (appli-
cation logic) [105]. Thus, the flexibility of FPGAs, by providing
an in-filed update, is taken one step further by the use of PR
feature. With PR, not whole FPGA but only parts of it are re-
configured by loading a partial configuration file, called partial
bitstream. After creating an operating design by configuring
the FPGA with a full bitfile, a partial bitfile may be downloaded
to modify pre-defined reconfigurable regions on it. Further, PR
ensures the modification of an operating design without com-
promising the integrity of applications executing on those parts
of the device that are not being reconfigured. Thus, with PR,
the logic in the FPGA design is divided into two different types,
reconfigurable (or dynamic) logic i.e., the portion being recon-
figured and static logic i.e., the portion resuming the work. If
the configuration of the FPGA is changed at run-time i.e., the
system is neither stopped nor switched off, then it is called as
dynamic partial reconfiguration.
In the following few definitions are given before explaining
the PR process itself. In the PR terminology, the area of the
FPGA that is reconfigured is called the Partially Reconfigurable
Region (PRR) which typically consists of a number of CLBs and
functional blocks. The module to be placed inside the PRR is
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called a Partially Reconfigurable Module (PRM), which is the
specific configuration of the PRR, and at least two PRMs are
needed per PRR for a PR design. A macro is a predefined con-
figuration for one or more FPGA components and a bus macro
is used for communication between static and dynamic regions
on an FPGA.
There are different methods to achieve a PR design such as
Difference-based, Module-based, and Relocatable. In a difference-
based PR, the new design consists of only the difference be-
tween current and new configuration file. In contrast, in a module-
based PR design, the partial module contains a new configura-
tion part of an FPGA which is independent of current configu-
ration. In relocatable configuration, the PRM may be moved to
a different location on an FPGA without modification. However,
in the following we address only the module-based PR because
it is the same technique based on which the STPM architecture
has been designed.
The PR of an FPGA is illustrated in Figure 4.3. In here, we
see that two PRMs which are mutually exclusive in time will
be placed in the PRR inside the FPGA i.e., only one PRM can
be assigned to a given PRR at a given time. The remaining re-
gion in the FPGA which is outside the PRR is the static region,
where the application which needs to be run uninterruptedly, is
placed. The configuration files placed inside the PRR are called
as partial bitstreams and the one placed inside the static region
is called the full bitstream. While configuring the FPGA in a PR
design, there exists a single full bitstream, in here the hardware
logic for controlling the loading of one out of multiple partial
bitstreams (PRMs) which are the applications themselves.
An application, Software Defined Radio (SDR), that may uti-
lize the PR feature is detailed in the following. In a SDR sys-
tem, different wave forms correspond to different radio chan-
[ July 18, 2013 at 11:31 ]
4.3 configuration port : icap 73
CE BUSY
WRITE
Input Output
CLK
Figure 4.4: Block Diagram of the ICAP [67]
nels with a given wave form establishing a communication with
a given channel [54]. These wave forms may be running in the
dynamic logic of the FPGA, and the user can upload a new wave-
form i.e., a partial bitstream, into the dynamic logic to listen to
a new channel. Further, any number of waveforms can be sup-
ported by a single hardware platform without disrupting the
established links to other channels, which is performed by the
full bitstream in the static logic of the device. This example ap-
plication explains the advantage that can be gained by utilizing
the PR feature, i.e., reducing the size of the FPGA required for
implementing a given function with consequent reductions in
cost and/or power consumption.
4.3 configuration port : icap
The ICAP is the one which performs the operations of the con-
figuration port depicted in STPM architecture (c.f. Figure 3.7).
The loading of partial bitfiles into the dynamic region of the
FPGA is done through the ICAP, a built-in hard core IP module
available on the FPGA, which is a part of the static logic. Further,
the ICAP interface offers the possibility of the configuration data
read out. Unlike the SelectMAP [5], the ICAP is an internal part
of the FPGA. All Xilinx Virtex devices starting from the Virtex-2
have a built-in ICAP and is controlled by the software driver for
the processor on the FPGA. In addition to the ICAP, the high-end
Virtex-5 provides serial interfaces such as SPI or Joint Test Ac-
tion Group (JTAG) and parallel interface such as SelectMAP, all
of which use the same procedure as the ICAP for reading and
writing the registers . With the ICAP, it is possible to perform a
partial reconfiguration at run time. Here, the bitstream can not
be transmitted over the conventional programming interfaces
such as JTAG or SPI, therefore the bitstream is first stored in a
Block Random Access Memory (BRAM) [107] or external media
before configuring the device through ICAP. The other alterna-
[ July 18, 2013 at 11:31 ]
74 design and implementation of stpm
Figure 4.5: ICAP Write Process [67]
tives include the configured access via communication media
such as Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter (UART)
and Ethernet.
The block diagram of an ICAP module is depicted in Fig-
ure 4.4. It has separate bus for both input and output (denoted
by ”Input", and ”Output" ports), which may be operated with
8, 16 or 32 bit wide data and a clock (denoted by ”CLK") fre-
quency of up to 100MHz [9]. The data width is specified at
instantiation, and the FPGA adjusts itself automatically, after de-
tecting the bus width sequence. Through the active low ”Chip
Enable" (CE) signal, the interface is activated and a switching
between writing and reading is done. The WRITE input indi-
cates the direction, whether the data is written (WRITE = 0) or
read (WRITE = 1) from the device. The BUSY signal indicates
the status of the read requests, i.e., only when it has reached a
low level, the data is stable at the output.
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Figure 4.6: Signal Diagram for Write Operation [67]
4.3.1 ICAP Write Operation
A state machine illustrating the write process of the ICAP is de-
picted in Figure 4.5. In the 32-bit bus configuration, per every
rising clock edge, the ICAP expects a data word at its input,
where as in the 8-bit mode, the data word corresponding to a
byte is split into four clocks. The protocol calls for a change
between read and write modes that the Chip Enable (CE) sig-
nal is deactivated before the write signal. After the change of
direction by the CE, the ICAP must be reactivated.
The state machine remains in the ”idle" state until a reconfig-
uration command is given. Once the reconfiguration activation
signal becomes stable at the input, the state machine prepares
to switch to ”prepare" state and sets the direction of writing
the data. In the following state i.e., ”reconfig", the ICAP is acti-
vated and processes the input with each rising edge of the clock.
Therefore, the input bitstream has to be previously stored in a
buffer or it must be ensured that the clock speed is adjusted ac-
cording to the data stream. If the source data can not be deliv-
ered fast enough, it is possible to interrupt the writing process
and to continue it later. For this, the CE input is set to high to
stop the ICAP operation or the clock signal is interrupted, which
also brings the ICAP to a halt. Once the CE goes low again and
the clock runs, the ICAP takes new commands. The waveform
depicted in Figure 4.6 shows the sequence of a write operation
and the points in time when the CE or WRITE signal must be
set.
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Figure 4.7: ICAP Read Process [67]
4.3.2 ICAP Read Operation
To read a register via the ICAP, as done in write process, the
read command is sent and consequently the WRITE signal is
changed to the read mode. This is represented as the state tran-
sition ”idle" -> ”prepare" -> ”write commands" -> ”prepare
read" in Figure 4.7. It must be ensured that the ICAP is de-
activated first (i.e., CE = 1) and then the direction is changed
(WRITE = 1). With renewed activation of the ICAP the data is
started to be sent via the output. This data can be read when
the BUSY signal is set to low (see Figure 4.8). Depending on
which register is defined for readout, one or several words are
stored in it. Illustrated in Figure 4.7 is only a simplified transi-
tion from the ”read data" state to the ”idle" state but in a real
application, commands arrive at the ICAP that need desynchro-
nization and a Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) reset.
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Figure 4.8: Signal Diagram for Read Operation [67]
4.4 execution engine : microblaze based microcon-
troller system
As mentioned before, the execution engine of the STPM is a
microprocessor with additionally attached components such
as memories and I/O for executing the TPM commands. For
this, a MicroBlaze processor based microcontroller system as
depicted in Figure 4.9 is utilized in here. The depicted sys-
tem is highly integrated and standalone which is intended for
controller applications. Data and program are stored in a local
memory while the debug is facilitated by the Microblaze Debug
Module (MDM) (an optional feature shown in gray). A standard
set of peripherals is also included, providing basic functional-
ity such as the interrupt controller, UART, timers and general
purpose I/O.
The MicroBlaze embedded processor is a soft core processor
with a Reduced Instruction Set Computer (RISC) optimization
for implementation in Xilinx FPGAs [103]. Local memory is used
for data and program storage and is implemented using BRAM.
The size of the local memory is parameterized and can be be-
tween 4kB and 64kB. The local memory is connected to the
MicroBlaze through the Local Memory Bus (LMB) and the LMB
BRAM interface controllers. The MDM, connects MicroBlaze de-
bug logic to the Xilinx Microprocessor Debugger (XMD), which
is a low level debugger. The XMD can be used for downloading
software, to set break points, view register and memory con-
tents. The I/O Module is a light-weight implementation of a
set of standard I/O functions commonly used in a MicroBlaze
processor sub-system.
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Figure 4.9: MicroBlaze based Microcontroller System [104]
The PetaLinux [97] is a Linux distribution and development
environment designed specifically for embedded systems, real-
ized using the Xilinx MicroBlaze soft-core processor. PetaLinux
contains the custom code of the Linux kernel, µClibc and a corre-
sponding adaptation of GNU tool chain (assemblers, compilers
for C, C++, linker, etc.) for developing the Linux kernel, libraries,
and programs. On this loaded distribution, the processor of the
microcontroller executes the TPM command execution software,
referred to as the TPM emulator [86]. It is a software written in C
language that emulates a conventional TPM with its command
set and functions according to the TCG specifications. It is im-
plemented as daemon, that reads the native TPM commands in
the form of sequences of bytes over the Unix domain socket in-
terface and sends back the TPM responses. The data that must
be stored permanently are stored in a file, similar to the way
the hardware TPMs store in a secure storage on the chip. The
cryptographic operations included with the TPM emulator are
the RSA, SHA-1, HMAC, and for the random number generator
the system command is used. For the system, the TPM emulator
appears just like a hardware TPM, which would be addressed
in the same way.
Thus, utilizing the aforementioned internal components, i.e.,
the MicroBlaze processor and PetaLinux distribution with the
running TPM emulator on it, along with memory and interfaces,
the microcontroller sub-system provides all the functionalities
as required by the execution engine of the STPM.
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4.5 nvm integration on the stpm
As mentioned in the previous chapter, one fundamental re-
quirement of the STPM architecture is to hold an on-board NVM
for storing persistent data such as cryptographic keys for se-
curely storing the platform data. However, the chosen platform
in our case is an SRAM based FPGA, which does not support
such a persistent memory and furthermore, the device itself is
volatile in nature. Thus, there is a need to integrate an external
NVM programmed with keys and then access it accordingly. For
such an integration and access, it is relied on the mechanism
proposed by Schellekens et al. [81], as detailed in the following.
4.5.1 Outline of NVM Access Protocol
The authors in here integrated a multiple-time-programmable
NVM onto an embedded System-on-Chip (SoC) for building a
trusted computing system. The NVM is protected against non-
invasive attacks utilizing a minimal cryptographic protocol that
establishes an authenticated channel between the system and
the NVM. The NVM access protocol relies on ”challenge-response"
pairs generated utilizing a PUF [87, 20]. The PUF is a physical
structure that is present on an integrated circuit due to vari-
ations in the manufacturing process. It uniquely identifies a
given device and the mathematical function derived from it can
not be cloned on another device. Additionally, a shared secret
KAuth between the NVM and the FPGA, also derived from the
PUF is required by the access protocol. Then utilizing a MAC
based authentication scheme a secure communication channel
is established between the external NVM and the FPGA of the
STPM.
A PUF may be implemented with the CLBs of the FPGA, re-
ferred to as ”Delay PUF", or with the start-up values of an unini-
tialized BRAM, referred to as ”SRAM PUF". The key, KAuth, is
extracted from the corresponding PUF response, RAuth, at the
point in time when needed, using the fuzzy extractor and cor-
responding helper data. The corresponding challenge, CAuth,
is embedded in the FPGA’s bitstream and moreover, the PUF
guarantees that given the challenge its response is still unpre-
dictable.
There exists a commercially available product, QuiddikeyTM
from Intrinsic-IDTM, providing a secure key storage functional-
ity utilizing the PUF [52]. It extracts the key derived from the
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PUF to protect the device and its content from counterfeiting
and cloning. It is available as an IP core and can be embedded
into any chip design. The advantage here is that the key is not
present when the device is powered-off. Given this, the KAuth
required in the NVM access protocol may be derived from this
product.
4.5.2 Protocol Operation
Read and write operations on the NVM, utilizing this access
protocol are illustrated in the following.
To describe the protocol operation we define the following
notation:
r Random number acting as a nonce for the
FPGA
i The address location inside the NVM
c Monotonic counter value acting as a nonce
for the NVM
Mi Message at address i
KAuth Shared secret key for generating the HMAC
HKAuth(c+ 1) HMAC of counter c+1 computed with key
KAuth
The FPGA module uses random numbers as source of fresh-
ness in the protocol, while the NVM makes use of a monotonic
counter c. Alternatively, the NVM may use a random number
generator to generate fresh nonces. The data read operation by
the FPGA of the STPM from an address location i of the NVM
is depicted in Figure 4.10. For this, first the FPGA generates a
nonce r and sends it to the NVM, together with address i. Then
the memory reads the content at address i, i.e., message Mi,
and the counter c from the internal address 0. Later, the mem-
ory returns Mi accompanied with c and a MAC on r, i, Mi, and
c. The FPGA accepts the message Mi and performs consequent
operations, only if the verified MAC is OK, otherwise it stops all
operations. Further, it stores c in volatile memory, because this
acts as a challenge for a subsequent write operation.
In order to write data securely to the NVM, the write op-
eration by the FPGA consists of the following steps (c.f. Fig-
ure 4.11). The FPGA retrieves c from its internal memory which
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FPGA NVM
r ∈R Zn
r||i
Mi ← Read(i)
c← Read(0)
Mi||c||HKAuth(r||i||Mi||c)
VerifyMAC
Figure 4.10: Read Protocol [81]
was stored during a previous operation. It sends the message
Mi
′′, that it wants to write at address i, accompanied with a
MAC on i, Mi ′′, and c. The NVM reads the monotonic counter
c from the internal address 0 before checking the MAC. If the
MAC is OK, it implies that the FPGA used the same value of c.
Then it stores the data Mi ′′ at i and increments the monotonic
counter by writing c+ 1 to internal address 0. The memory re-
turns a MAC on the new counter value (i.e., c + 1), which is
verified by the FPGA to determine whether the write operation
was successful or not.
4.6 programmable flash
In addition to the NVM described above, the STPM architecture
must also contain an on-board rewritable NVM such as pro-
grammable Flash to store the bitfiles that need to be loaded
into the static and dynamic regions on every boot-up of the
system. This Flash is programmable because it has to support
loading of new bitfiles (i.e., new cryptographic engines) as re-
quired by the user. In the generic architecture of the STPM, such
a memory was included inside the execution engine as embed-
ded Flash (c.f. Figure 3.9). However, the utilized FPGAs being
volatile, the bitfiles are stored in an external Flash memory. A
high performance interface, referred to as SelectMAP configura-
tion interface, is utilized to access the data from this Flash and
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FPGA NVM
c← Read(0)
i||Mi ′′||HKAuth(i||Mi
′′||c)
VerifyMAC
Write(i, Mi ′′)
Write(0, c+ 1)
HKAuth(c+ 1)
VerifyMAC
Figure 4.11: Write Protocol [81]
to configure the FPGA. The SelectMAP configuration interface
provides an 8-bit, 16-bit, or 32-bit bidirectional data bus inter-
face to the Virtex-5 configuration logic that can be used for both
configuration and readback [107].
In this context, the Platform Flash XL is the memory that is
specially optimized for high-performance Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA
configuration and ease-of-use. This memory integrates 128 Mb
of in-system programmable Flash storage and performance fea-
tures for configuration within a small-footprint FT64 package.
Power-on burst read mode and dedicated I/O power supply en-
able Platform Flash XL to meet seamlessly with the Virtex-5
FPGA SelectMAP configuration interface. A wide, 16-bit data
bus delivers the FPGA configuration bitstream at speeds upto
800 Mb/s without wait states. A simplified model of the Plat-
form Flash XL configuration solution for a Virtex-5 FPGA is de-
picted in Figure 4.12.
Although two different types of memories i.e., an external
authenticated NVM and a programmable Flash for storage pur-
pose are presented here, they may reside in a single physical
component while manufacturing the STPM as a product.
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Figure 4.12: Flash XL High-Performance FPGA Configuration [107]
4.7 design of the stpm architecture
Based on the aforementioned selected components, a novel ar-
chitecture for the STPM utilizing an SRAM based FPGA is de-
picted in Figure 4.13. The TPM communicates with the central
processor of a PC over an I/O interface i.e., the LPC bus which is
standardized by the TCG. The other bus interfaces could be Sys-
tem Management Bus (SMBus) and Advanced Microcontroller
Bus Architecture (AMBA) bus, which essentially provide a se-
cure exchange of data between the processor and the TPM. Thus,
to comply with the standards, the STPM is also required to com-
municate over one of the above interfaces, in this case the LPC
bus. However, when the STPM is used in an embedded system
the user is free to choose any available SoC bus.
As mentioned before, the underlying FPGA architecture of the
STPM supports the PR feature. Utilizing this feature the FPGA’s
logic is divided into static and dynamic parts as depicted in
Figure 4.13. The dotted lines separating the regions denote the
communication boundary between the two parts. The static
logic of the FPGA is loaded with the non-updatable components,
i.e., a full bitfile from the Flash, upon initialization of the de-
vice. This full bitfile comprises of MicroBlaze based microcon-
troller system (execution engine) and the update algorithm of
the STPM. Though the configuration port (i.e., ICAP) is included
as a part of the update algorithm (c.f. Figure 4.13), it is available
as a hard-core IP on the FPGA. However, its inclusion in the up-
date algorithm is to illustrate the logic resource consumption
of such a port, as done later in this chapter while describing
the implementation of the STPM architecture. The execution en-
gine executes all the TPM commands given by the processor
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Figure 4.13: Design of STPM Architecture based on an FPGA
and the results of these commands are communicated over an
I/O interface. The update algorithm provides a secure update
of the cryptographic engines on the STPM, arriving as bitfiles
from the server. In addition to the ICAP interface, the update al-
gorithm consists of a PR controller for controlled loading of the
engines into the dynamic part. The dynamic part of the FPGA is
loaded with partial bitfiles, which represent the cryptographic
engines of the TPM. Additionally, this part being reconfigurable,
allows the update of the loaded engines when they are compro-
mised. The communication between the NVM, Flash, and the
FPGA (along with its internal communication) utilize the afore-
mentioned protocols and interfaces accordingly. Further, the
STPM (with all its components) is protected by a secure pack-
age, referred to as security boundary, to avoid physical attacks
on it. The most important feature of the STPM is to securely sup-
port hardware update (i.e., cryptographic engine update), thus
providing a flexible and scalable design of cryptographic en-
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Upadate Server Computer System with STPM
AuthorizeSession
(
kh, encpk(kh)(S)
)
ah,ne
K1 =
hmacs (ad(kh),ne, 1)
K2 =
hmacs (ad(kh),ne, 2)
K1 =
hmacs (ad(kh),ne, 1)
K2 =
hmacs (ad(kh),ne, 2)
Attest the state(ah, kh,no),
encK2(newauth),
hmacK1 (ne,no,null, . . .)
Send PCR Values,n ′e, hmacK1 (n
′
e,no,null, . . .)
Send Acknowledgement for success or failure
Figure 4.14: Protocol for Secure Session Establishment [40]
gines on it, which is in general not the case with conventional
TPMs.
4.8 session establishment protocol
A secure session needs to be established between the update
server and the PC (with embedded STPM inside it) before per-
forming an update. For this, a well-defined communication pro-
tocol, called SKAP (c.f. Figure 4.14), designed by Chen et al. [26]
has been utilized. The designers of SKAP utilized the protocol
for a secure session establishment between the user process and
a conventional TPM, for executing commands and for message
exchange. Therefore, this protocol has been adopted to the STPM
requirements as defined by Feller et al. in [40]. In specific, un-
like the standard approach the modified protocol is utilized for
communication between an entity supporting partial reconfig-
uration and a remote entity. This scenario is identical to the
considered scenario here i.e., communication between the STPM
and the update server. Thus, we rely on the same protocol for a
secure communication between these two entities. However, it
is the PC, which communicates directly with the update server,
through an external channel, to obtain the update data before
transferring it to the STPM. Furthermore, the communication be-
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tween PC and the STPM is assumed to be trusted to avoid any
additional problems created by a compromise of this internal
channel.
As a first step in the session establishment process, a com-
mand for authorizing the session, referred to as AuthorizeSes-
sion, with a key handle kh and an encrypted secret S (utilizing
kh) as parameters, is sent from update server to the PC. In re-
sponse, the PC sends an authorization handle ah and a newly
generated nonce ne back to the update server. With the avail-
able secret S, nonce ne, and handle kh both the entities compute
two secrets K1 and K2 on their side. These secrets are the HMAC
computations on the handle kh and nonce ne utilizing the se-
cret S as the key. Then the command, AttestState with a set of
parameters, requesting the attestation of the computer system
is issued by the update server. In turn, the PC responds to the
server with a digitally signed set of PCR values to authenticate
both, itself and the STPM, to the server. If the authentication
is successful then a session is established between the server
and the STPM, else the session is terminated. The success or fail-
ure of the update process is reported to the server by means
of additional authentication data. After establishing a secure
session, the update phenomenon follows the steps defined in
Section 3.5.2. Unlike OSAP and OIAP protocols specified by the
TCG in [92], SKAP relies on public key cryptography to avoid
both, TPM impersonation and weak authorization data attacks
as presented in [26].
4.9 update utilizing the stpm architecture
With the available STPM architecture and the protocol for se-
cure session establishment, an update of two of the fundamen-
tal cryptographic engines, i.e., the SHA-1 and the RSA, utilizing
the defined update algorithm are detailed as test cases in the
following [64, 65].
4.9.1 Test Case1: Update of the SHA-1 Engine
An update of compromised SHA-1 engine with an uncompro-
mised new SHA-2 engine is depicted in Figure 4.15. The set up is
identical to the system level view of an algorithm update on the
STPM as depicted in Figure 3.2. The update server comprises of
the bitfile library with the configuration data (denoted by PRMs)
for the defined locations (denoted by PRRs) inside the dynamic
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Figure 4.15: Updating SHA-1 Engine on STPM
logic of the FPGA. The dotted lines extending from the PRMs in
the update server to the PRRs inside the dynamic logic indicate
an association of cryptographic engines to their corresponding
locations. Though it is depicted as a direct communication be-
tween the update server and the STPM for simplicity, the actual
procedure for configuring the dynamic logic is performed by
the host PC through the update algorithm as detailed in Sec-
tion 3.5.2.
With reference to re-establishing the trust in the system af-
ter the SHA-1 engine update (c.f. Section 3.6.1), it is mandatory
to unseal the data before resealing it to the new platform. To
achieve this, it has been assumed that the dynamic logic has to
support execution of two hash engines in parallel i.e., an old
hash engine for unsealing the data and a new hash engine for
sealing the data to the new platform state. In this context, it can
be seen that the dynamic logic of the FPGA in Figure 4.15 holds
two PRRs, one with the old SHA-1 engine and the other with the
new SHA-2 engine.
On a normal start-up of the PC, the STPM embedded inside it
is configured with the initial configuration and is running. This
initial configuration, stored inside the Flash memory, is the pre-
vious bitstream data for both static and dynamic logics of the
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Figure 4.16: Block Diagram for Hash Computation [33]
FPGA. Assuming that the SHA-1 engine on the STPM is compro-
mised, then an update request is sent by the update server to
the PC. The communication between the two may be over the In-
ternet in case of a remote update or through an UART controller,
in case of a local update. Then, a secure session is established
between the PC and the update server utilizing the SKAP pro-
tocol (c.f. Section 4.8). Once a secure session is established, the
update of the new engine is performed following the procedure
defined in Section 3.5.2.
4.9.2 SHA-1 and SHA-2 Operation
The most widely used hash functions today belong to the SHA
family [33], which are developed and published by NIST. The
generalized operation of a hash function (either SHA-1 or SHA-2)
is depicted in Figure 4.16. The function ”F" represents the core
of the algorithms, i.e., the corresponding compression function
utilized by one of them.
In the following the individual steps in the operation of the
SHA-1 function are given:
• As a first step, the message M of l bits is padded with
a value k to give the smallest solution of the expression,
l + k ≡ 448 mod 512, before appending a 1 followed by
k − 1 number of ”zeros" at the message end due to the
function being big-endian in operation [43].
• Following this, a 64-bit binary representation of the orig-
inal length of the message (i.e., l bits) is appended. This
padding makes the message M, a multiple of 512 bits, al-
lowing it to be split into N 512 bit blocks.
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Figure 4.17: FPGA Editor View of the SHA-2 Implementation
• These blocks are then passed through the SHA-1 compres-
sion function, which comprises of logical operations such
as XOR and LeftRotations (RotL), to carry out 4 rounds of
20 steps each (giving 80 steps in total) to create a digest.
• While doing this, the hash value will change due to the
previous values calculated in a round, thus a buffer is
used to hold the intermediate and final result of the hash
function, which is initialized with a pre-defined constant,
initialization vector (IV). This buffer is 160 bit long which
is the length of the digest for SHA-1 algorithm.
• Once all the 512 bit blocks have been processed a 160 bit
output is produced, which is the hash value of the input
message M.
The SHA-2 algorithm was developed due to weaknesses, i.e.,
a possible theoretical collision attack, found in SHA-1 algorithm
[98]. An implementation of SHA-2 algorithm with 224 bit digest
output on a Xilinx Virtex-5 LX110T FPGA platform is depicted
in Figure 4.17. In its operation, SHA-2 is identical to SHA-1 but
because the output digest being one of 224/256/384/512 bits,
the primary differences are more number of initial blocks of
input message and fewer number of rounds in the compression
function [68]. The other differences are the use of right shifts as
well as left shifts, constants for each round instead of blocks of
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Figure 4.18: Updating RSA Engine on STPM
rounds, and the use of 64 bit inputs on the 512 bit function over
the 32-bit use in the former.
• Messages are initially padded from 16 to 64 rounds using
logical calculations based on the input message and each
round is calculated using six variables based on the eight
message blocks and 64 rounds.
• Unlike SHA-1, where there are four round calculations,
SHA-2 uses only one round. Its inherent strength comes
from the use of 64 round constants over the 4 round con-
stants in the former, which further reduces the risk of col-
lisions.
4.9.3 Test Case2: Update of the RSA Engine
An update of compromised RSA engine with an uncompromised
new ECC engine [57] is depicted in Figure 4.18. The procedure is
identical to the one described in SHA-1 engine update except for
the updated algorithm. Once a successful update is performed
then the trust in the system is re-established utilizing the steps
detailed in Section 3.6.2.
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4.9.4 RSA and ECC Operation
The algorithms RSA and ECC are public key algorithms, in which
each user or the device taking part in the communication have
a pair of keys, a public key and a private key, and a set of op-
erations associated with these keys to provide cryptographic
capabilities. Only the particular user knows the private key
whereas the public key is distributed to all users taking part
in the communication. Public key algorithms, unlike private
key algorithms (e.g., AES), does not require any shared secret
between the communicating parties but it is much slower than
the latter.
The RSA algorithm is one of the best known and widely used
public key algorithm for protecting the user data. Its operation
mainly involves key generation, encryption, and decryption op-
erations as detailed in the following [95].
• For key generation, it first selects two distinct random
prime numbers, for example, p and q to compute the
product n = pq, where n is referred to as modulus.
• Then it computes the Euler’s totient function, φ(n) =
(p− 1)(q− 1) before choosing an integer e, satisfying 1 <
e < φ(n) and gcd(e,φ(n)) = 1, where gcd represents the
greatest common divisor operation. The chosen e repre-
sents the public encryption key and is denoted as (e,n).
• For computing the private key d, denoted by (d,n), an op-
eration, d ≡ e-1mod(φ(n)), is performed. Once the pub-
lic/private key pair is available the encryption and de-
cryption operations on the message may be performed.
• To encrypt a message m, the sender first has to obtain the
recipient’s public key, (e,n) before representing the mes-
sage as an integer in the interval [0,n− 1]. Then compute
the cipher text, c, using the operation, c = memod(n). To
decrypt the cipher text c, the recipient uses his private key
(d,n) to compute m = cdmod(n).
The security of the RSA is based on the fact that it is far more
difficult to factorize a product of two primes than it is to mul-
tiply the two primes. The signature generation and verification
operations inherently involve encryption and decryption oper-
ations but with private and public keys respectively. An imple-
mentation of the RSA modular exponentiation operation based
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Figure 4.19: FPGA Editor View of the RSA (Modular Exponentiation)
Implementation
on 2048 bit key pair, on a Virtex-5 LX110T FPGA platform, is
depicted in Figure 4.19.
The operational details of the ECC algorithm are detailed in
the following [16]. The mathematical operation of ECC is de-
fined over the elliptic curve y2 = x3 + ax + b, where 4a3 +
27b2 6= 0, where each value of a and b gives a different elliptic
curve. All points (x,y) which satisfy the above equation and
a point at infinity lie on this elliptic curve with the public key
being a point on the curve and the private key being a random
number.
The security of ECC depends on the difficulty of elliptic curve
discrete logarithm problem as detailed below. Let P and Q be
two points on an elliptic curve such that kP = Q, where k is a
scalar. Given P and Q, it is computationally infeasible to obtain
k, which is the discrete logarithm of Q to the base P. Thus, the
fundamental operation involved in ECC is point multiplication,
i.e., multiplication of a scalar k with any point P on the curve
to obtain another point Q on the curve. In contrast, the funda-
mental operation utilized by the RSA engine is the modular ex-
ponentiation, which is computationally less efficient compared
to the point multiplication. This feature makes the ECC engine
to consume fewer resources on the considered architecture and
to operate at a faster speed than RSA. The main advantage of
ECC is that it provides the same level of security as provided by
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the RSA, but with considerably smaller key sizes. For example,
the 1024/2048 bit security strength of the RSA may be offered
by only 160/224 bit ECC [72].
Point multiplication is achieved by two basic elliptic curve
operations, point addition and point doubling. Point addition is
to add two points J and K on the curve to obtain another point
L, i.e., L = J+K. Whereas point doubling is to add a point J to
itself to obtain another point L, i.e., L = 2J. For example, let P be
a point on an elliptic curve and k be a scalar that is multiplied
with the point P to obtain another point Q on the curve, i.e.,
to find Q = kP. Thus, if k = 23, then the point multiplication
operation kP = 23.P = 2(2(2(2P) + P) + P) + P, represents the
utilization of point addition and point doubling repeatedly to
find the result. The elliptic curve operations on real numbers
(as defined above) are slow and inaccurate due to round-off
errors. However, the cryptographic operations need to be faster
and accurate, thus to make operations on elliptic curve accurate
and more efficient, the curve cryptography is defined over two
finite fields, i.e., prime field, GF(p) and binary field, GF(2n) [31].
The field is chosen with finitely large number of points suited
for cryptographic operations and in here we choose the prime
field. The equation of the elliptic curve on a prime field GF(p) is
y2modp = x3+ ax+ bmodp, where 4a3+ 27b2modp 6= 0. Here
the elements of the finite field are integers between 0 and p− 1
and all the operations involve integers between this range. The
prime number p is chosen in the range between 112 to 521 bits
such that there is finitely large number of points on the elliptic
curve to make the cryptosystem secure.
Signature algorithm is utilized for authenticating a device or
a message sent by that device. For example, consider two de-
vices A and B, to authenticate a message sent by A, the device
A signs the message using its private key. Then it sends the mes-
sage and the signature to the device B, which can be verified
only by using the public key of device A. Given that the device
B knows A’s public key, it can verify whether the message is
indeed sent by A or not. Similarly, Elliptic Curve Digital Signa-
ture Algorithm (ECDSA) is a variant of the DSA that operates on
elliptic curve groups. For sending a signed message from A to
B, both have to agree upon a set of elliptic curve domain param-
eters such as n and G. Sender A has a key pair consisting of a
private key dA (a randomly selected integer less than n, where
n is the order of the curve) and a public key QA = dA ∗ G,
where G is the generator point.
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Figure 4.20: FPGA based STPM Architecture Implementation [77]
However, the TCG specification mandates the use of RSA as
the standard asymmetric engine inside the TPM. Given the ca-
pabilities of the ECC such as performing identical operations as
RSA but with more efficiency, in case of a compromise of the
latter on STPM, the former is a promising candidate to replace
it.
4.10 implementation of the stpm architecture
The STPM architecture is implemented as a proof-of-concept on
an SRAM based FPGA as depicted in Figure 4.20. The FPGA uti-
lized is the Xilinx Virtex-5 LX110T device supporting PR and
the required interfaces as detailed earlier. For the implementa-
tion in here, a local update scenario is considered i.e., the PC
acts as an update server and the FPGA acts as the STPM mod-
ule and the communication between them is achieved over an
UART interface. In specific, individual components in each of
the static and the dynamic regions are formally described as a
structure in a hardware description language i.e., VHSIC Hard-
ware Description Language (VHDL), for performing an analysis.
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Figure 4.21: RTL Schematic of the AES Algorithm
This structural description of each of the block is first simu-
lated and then synthesized utilizing the vendor specific tools
for measuring their performance in terms of execution speed
and computational resources consumed on the target device as
detailed in the following.
In specific, the components execution engine is implemented
as a MicroBlaze based microprocessor system utilizing the Xil-
inx Embedded Development Kit (EDK) tool. Further, it is synthe-
sized to determine the number of registers and LUTs consumed
on the target platform. For other blocks, i.e., update algorithm
and the updatable cryptographic engines, individual hardware
descriptions in VHDL are written, simulated, and synthesized
utilizing the Xilinx Integrated Software Environment (ISE) tool
for their evaluation.
4.10.1 Static Logic Implementation
The major components inside the static logic are the MicroB-
laze based microcontroller system and the update algorithm
with configuration port. Further, it includes the controller in-
terfaces for UART, external Flash, external memory, and an IP
interface (IPIF) to the updatable cryptographic engines block
in the dynamic region. The core component of the update al-
gorithm being the AES algorithm, figures illustrating its opera-
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Figure 4.22: Simulation Results of the AES Algorithm
tional schematic, simulation results, and floorplanning on the
device are presented in here.
The AES is a symmetric block cipher with a block size of 128
bits and the key can be 128/192/256 bits. In this thesis a 128
bit symmetric key with 10 rounds of operations is utilized [38].
The algorithm utilizes a substitution and permutation type of
network (c.f. Figure 4.21), with the main loop of the algorithm
involving the operations: SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns,
and AddRoundKey. The first three operations are designed to
thwart cryptanalysis via the methods of substitution and per-
mutation, while the fourth operation actually encrypts the data.
The plaintext is formatted into 16 byte (128-bit) blocks, and each
block is treated as a 4x4 array. Then the algorithm performs
aforementioned four operations in each round, except for the
last round in which the MixColumns operation is excluded, to
generate the output cipher text [38].
The time for update execution is the time amount required
for loading, decrypting, integrity & authenticity verifying, and
reconfiguring the partial bitstream, i.e., the new asymmetric
cryptographic engine or the new hash engine. In our case, it
is the AES core that represents the central component of the up-
date algorithm, thus it determines the achievable speed while
updating the architecture. The simulation results, as depicted in
Figure 4.22, show that the time for 128 bit encryption, decryp-
tion, and authentication is 46 ns for each operation. These re-
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Figure 4.23: FPGA Editor View of the AES Implementation
sults are obtained when the algorithm is executed on a Virtex-5
LX110T FPGA board with Xilinx Isim simulator tool. Given this,
if the size of the update data is 3Mb (typical bit stream size in
Xilinx FPGAs is from 3 Mb to 30 Mb), then the authentication
and decryption operations together result in around 2mswhen
operating the FPGA at a frequency of 358 MHz. Further, with
the configuration port i.e., the Virtex-5 FPGA ICAP supporting
a transfer rate of around 3 Gb/s when operating at 100 MHz
frequency, would take only 1ms to configure 3Mb of data into
the dynamic logic of the STPM. Thus, the overall update time
is only few milli seconds when loading a new cryptographic
engine onto the STPM but one still has to consider the trans-
mission time of update data from the update server in a real
application.
The distribution of the resources consumed by the AES al-
gorithm on the device logic is depicted in Figure 4.23. With
the available AES implementation in the background, the up-
date algorithm, comprising of AES based cryptographic algo-
rithms, ICAP, and the controller for the overall operation is im-
plemented. The resource consumption values corresponding to
the implemented update algorithm are listed in Table 4.1 and
additionally an implementation view of the same is depicted in
Figure 4.24. The rectangular area (red box) with dots depicted
in here is much denser than the one in Figure 4.23, which repre-
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Figure 4.24: FPGA Editor View of Update Algorithm Implementation
Module Regs. LUTs 36Kbit
BRAM
AES-128 bit 524 899 5
AES-Hash-Core 289 138 0
AES-HMAC-Core 294 184 0
PR ICAP 170 168 2
Controller 662 453 0
Update Algorithm 1939 1842 7
Table 4.1: Resource Consumption of Update Algorithm
sents a higher resource consumption by the update algorithm
than the single AES algorithm.
The other major component of the static logic is the execu-
tion engine, which in this case is the MicroBlaze based micro-
controller system. The implementation of the execution engine
is split into two parts i.e., the processor itself and the controller
interfaces (for accessing the external memories NVM & Flash
and the LPC bus). The former part is labeled under MicroBlaze
and the latter are categorized under peripherals. The overall
resource consumption of the execution engine is listed in Ta-
ble 4.2 and the corresponding editor view is depicted in Fig-
ure 4.25.
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Figure 4.25: FPGA Editor View of Execution Engine Implementation
Module Regs. LUTs 36Kbit
BRAM
MicroBlaze Processor 2326 2704 4
Peripherals 4629 3351 11
Execution Engine 6955 6055 15
Table 4.2: Resource Consumption of Execution Engine
Table 4.3 summarizes the overall resource consumption of the
static logic implementation, i.e., the update algorithm and the
execution engine after a synthesis run. It can be seen that the
total amount of resources consumed is only 12% of available
registers (Regs.) and 11% of available LUTs on the considered
FPGA target.
4.10.2 Dynamic Logic Implementation
The dynamic logic of FPGA inside the STPM comprises of the
cryptographic engines, which when compromised may be re-
placed with the new cryptographic engines. The resource con-
sumption of these cryptographic engine implementations after
a synthesis run is listed in Table 4.4. These engines are loaded
into the dynamic logic partition of the FPGA during the STPM
operation. It can be seen that the dynamic region may occupy
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Module Regs. LUTs 36Kbit
BRAM
Update Algorithm 1939 1842 7
Execution Engine 6955 6055 15
Total Static Logic 8894 7897 22
Table 4.3: Resource Consumption of STPM Static Logic
Engine Register LUT 36Kbit
BRAM
Max.
Freq.
(MHz)
RSA (Mod. Expo.) 7371 8130 7 201.423
ECC (Pt. Mult.) 1207 2455 2 194.476
SHA-1 1013 1754 0 156.14
HMAC 1722 2353 0 156.14
SHA-2 2694 4793 0 271.444
RNG 1424 1248 5 283.68
Cryptographic Engines 15431 20733 14
Table 4.4: Resource Consumption of STPM Cryptographic Engines
the major portion of the FPGA because the static logic is rather
small in size. Therefore, the new cryptographic engines to be
loaded onto the device find plenty of reconfigurable resources.
Though the update algorithm inside the static logic comprises
of a hash engine, i.e., AES-Hash, the dynamic logic is loaded
with a new SHA-2 engine, in case of a compromise, because
most of today’s computers utilize only the standard SHA series
algorithms. Further, this choice is made to comply to the stan-
dard TCG specifications stating the use of these hash algorithms
in current and future TPM technology. For an asymmetric algo-
rithm, to evaluate the efficiency of its implementation, it is typ-
ical to implement and evaluate its fundamental operation. In
this context, for evaluating RSA and ECC, the modular exponen-
tiation operation and the point multiplication operation respec-
tively are implemented on the target platform. It can be seen
that the latter operation consumes significantly less resources
compared to the former. Additionally, the sum of resources con-
sumed by ECC, SHA-1, HMAC, SHA-2, and RNG is almost equal to
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Power off
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Figure 4.26: STPM Life Cycle
that of resources consumed by the RSA alone. Therefore, the
replacement of the RSA engine by the ECC engine is justifiable.
With reference to Table 4.3 and Table 4.4, the current STPM
design implementation occupies around 35% of available regis-
ters and 41% of available LUTs on the considered FPGA target.
In addition to the static and dynamic logic resources, the FPGA
of the STPM is attached with an external Flash memory of size 1
GB, which is large enough to hold both the platform keys and
the bitfiles, thus providing the combined features of NVM and
programmable Flash for the STPM design. This external Flash
is accessed by the MicroBlaze processor over a dedicated Flash
controller, referred to as System ACE CF Controller [102]. Fur-
thermore, any additional requirements such as tamper detec-
tion and others may be included in the design as and where
required.
The flexibility of loading different cryptographic engines on
the STPM architecture provides the system with a level of secu-
rity, which is even higher than the security provided by the con-
ventional TPM. This is because, for example, the newly loaded
cryptographic engines onto the STPM may feature side-channel
or quantum crypto resistance properties. Further, the Flash mem-
ory may hold various implementations of the required crypto-
graphic algorithms such that the user can choose from. The
aforementioned two features satisfy the requirements of the
TPM.Next specification by the TCG.
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The life cycle of the STPM, as depicted in Figure 4.26, is similar
to the life cycle of conventional TPM but with an additional ca-
pability to handle the compromised cryptographic engines (c.f.
Figure 2.2). As an example application, the TPM plays a major
role in an enterprise security by providing a number of trusted
cryptographic and information security capabilities. One such
capability is the trusted boot, which in contrast to the secure
boot, takes only measurements upto the boot loader and leaves
it upto the remote party to determine the system’s trustworthi-
ness. This and the other capabilities such as user authentication
and data protection rely on a secure RSA and SHA-1 algorithms
whose compromise leads to a loss of huge enterprise data. Thus,
utilizing the novel architecture proposed in this work, i.e., the
STPM, the compromised hash and asymmetric algorithms may
be updated with new correspondingly uncompromised algo-
rithms to protect sensitive enterprise data.
[ July 18, 2013 at 11:31 ]
5
A P P L I C A T I O N S O F S T P M F E A T U R E S
The PR capability of the underlying FPGA is one important fea-
ture that made the design of the STPM possible. There exist
some more advantages of the PR technology that may be used
in various applications. Similarly, one more significant compo-
nent of the STPM, i.e., the update algorithm, whose capabilities
may be applied in other domains such as automotive electron-
ics, in specific to real-time embedded systems. With reference to
above, two different applications that utilize the PR feature and
the update algorithm of the STPM respectively are illustrated in
this chapter.
5.1 a novel ip protection scheme
Currently SRAM based FPGAs are becoming increasingly pop-
ular as building blocks of electronic systems because of ad-
vantages such as easy design modification (reconfigurability),
rapid prototyping, economical cost for low volume production,
and availability of sophisticated design and debugging tools.
Applications of FPGAs in the area of consumer electronics in-
clude, for example, television circuits, communication and video
processing devices, and software-defined radios. Considering
that the FPGAs are becoming so important for the electronic in-
dustry, it is necessary to think about the security of FPGA based
systems. The security of FPGA requires two fundamental mea-
sures to be taken i.e., protecting the FPGA data and the FPGA
design itself. In the former case, it is necessary to protect the
FPGA application i.e., the data inside the circuit and the data
transferred to/from the peripheral circuits during the commu-
nication. Whereas in the latter, the concerns are against cloning
and reverse engineering the FPGA design i.e., the configuration
data, which is the IP of the original designer. Thus, with the in-
crease in deployment of FPGAs in modern embedded systems,
the IP protection has become a necessary requirement for many
IP vendors, as presented in sequel.
There exist many proposals in the literature for IP protection,
from commercial vendors such as Xilinx and Altera, using sym-
metric encryption techniques. However, these methods have a
103
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drawback i.e., they need a cryptographic key (i.e., the sym-
metric key) to be stored in a non-volatile memory located on
FPGA or in a battery-backed RAM as done in some of the cur-
rent FPGAs. The expenses with such methods are, occupation of
larger area on FPGA in the former case and limited lifetime of
the device in the latter, the requirements which are crucial for
resource constrained embedded systems. In contrast, a novel
method which combines the dynamic PR feature of an SRAM
based FPGA (c.f. 4.2) with the PKC (detailed later) to protect the
FPGA configuration files without the need of fixed key storage
on FPGA or external to FPGA, is proposed in here [63]. Further,
the proposed scheme is implemented as a proof-of-concept on
Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA platform to illustrate the feasibility of the
design.
A brief description of various possible attacks on the FPGAs
is given in the following:
• Cloning is when a competitor makes a copy of the design,
and when he is able to make a copy of the pirated sys-
tem. With FPGAs it is very simple to clone an unprotected
design as the bitstream can be copied to another FPGA’s
configuration memory.
• In the case of reverse engineering the design is copied by re-
constructing a schematic or netlist level representation. As
demonstrated in [73], methods intended to convert FPGA
bitstreams into netlists are relatively easy to apply and
may soon deliver widely usable results. The reverse engi-
neering is more serious than cloning because in the former,
the attacker understands how the design works and may
modify it with malicious intent. These two correspond to
different attacks, and the design security must protect the
system against both these attacks. The papers [13] and
[14] give some information about these different attacks.
• The non-invasive attacks gather all the methods that use
external means. For example the attackers may use all the
possibilities of the circuit inputs in order to obtain all the
different outputs and draw the system truth table, this
method is called “black box attack". In the case of an SRAM
based FPGA, a simple attack method can be, intercepting
the bitstream between the root ROM and the FPGA when
the power is switched on. More complex attacks can use
power and electromagnetic changes and measures like the
simple or differential power analysis as presented in [66].
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• The invasive (- or physical) attacks are characterized by
the necessity to destroy the integrated circuit (component
package) to study the chip (design inside the component)
using some complex methods. For example, it is possible
to use a laser cutter microscope in order to split the chip in
several slices and understand the chip layout as discussed
in [24]. These attacks may use sophisticated tools such as
optical microscope and mechanical probes. As these at-
tacks use the weakness of the silicon technology, when
they are possible, it is very hard to secure the system
against them.
However, the proposed method, is secure against only the
known attacks such as the Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack
and the replay attack, which are categorized under non-invasive
attacks. Especially, the method protects the bitstream against in-
terception by an attacker on the communication channel (Internet/Non-
Internet based) between IP vendor (local or remote) and sys-
tem developer (local or remote). Furthermore, using this novel
method not only high-end FPGAs but also low-end FPGAs with
PR capabilities are secured. One application scenario for the pro-
posed method can be a secure IP deployment in an embedded
system design in the automotive electronics.
The PKC scheme utilizes asymmetric key algorithms such as
RSA and ECC, which unlike symmetric key algorithms, do not
require a secure initial exchange of key between the sender and
the receiver. The asymmetric key algorithms are used to create a
mathematically related key pair: a secret private key and a pub-
lished public key. Messages are encrypted with the recipient’s
public key and can only be decrypted with the corresponding
private key, which is known only to the receiver. In Figure 5.1,
we see that all of the functions in the “dashed box" (named
as secure box) may be implemented within the physical pack-
age of the FPGA. The plaintext and the private key information
never leave a well-protected container i.e., the secure box.
5.1.1 Conventional Schemes
There exist some solutions in the literature to overcome the key
storage and additional battery problems for the IP protection,
as described next. Tom Kean of the Algotronix society proposed
ideas to store the cryptographic secret key on FPGA, such as
using laser to program a set of links during manufacture [55].
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Figure 5.1: Public Key Cryptography
However, in his method the encryption and decryption circuits
are embedded inside the FPGA which causes less available sili-
con area for developed applications. Furthermore, the encryp-
tion and decryption circuits are fixed, thus it is not possible to
upgrade them. In contrast, Yip et al. have proposed an IP pro-
tection scheme that utilizes partial-encryption technique [109].
The authors in here claim that their technique outperforms the
full-encryption technique in terms of the reverse engineering
cost. Guajardo et al. have proposed a different scheme that uti-
lizes FPGA’s intrinsic PUF and asymmetric cryptography [47].
Though their method uses asymmetric key based authentica-
tion protocol which does not need the private key to be stored
on the FPGA, they did not make use of the advantages provided
by the PR feature. Additionally, the PUF implementation and its
analysis on the FPGA is in itself a challenging task.
The other technique is the watermarking proposed by Lach et
al. [61], where they apply a watermark to the physical layout of
a digital circuit. This watermark when onto an FPGA, uniquely
identifies the circuit origin and is yet difficult to detect. In con-
trast, Güneysu et al. used both public key and symmetric key
cryptography to dynamically protect the IP of circuits in config-
uration files [48]. In their method the symmetric cryptography
is hard-wired and the public-key functionality is moved into a
temporary configuration bitstream for a one-time setup proce-
dure. Also, Bossuet et al. have proposed a scheme where an em-
bedded key is accessible to the user logic and uses PR to encrypt
and decrypt the bitstream [21]. Here, an on-chip key is used to
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Figure 5.2: Conventional Scheme for IP Protection
encrypt the main design’s bitstream before storing it in a pro-
grammable ROM where a decryption bitstream is also stored.
In [82], Simpson et al. have proposed an off-line authentication
scheme for secure delivery of IP modules in non-networked en-
vironments of FPGA design. Their scheme implements a mutual
authentication of the IP modules and the hardware platform,
thereby enabling the authentication and integrity assurances to
both system developer and IP provider.
However, all these methods need a secret key to be stored on
an FPGA which in itself is a challenge in SRAM based FPGAs as
the memory on these devices is volatile. In contrast, the novelty
of our method is that it does not need any fixed key storage, ei-
ther on the FPGA or outside of it because the keys are generated
on the fly. There is no threat of the private key being stolen, as
it is stored (temporarily) deep inside the memory blocks which
are erased when the device is turned off. Furthermore, the keys
are generated on the FPGA (simultaneously on the IP vendor
side) which may be used for secure deployment of IP in the
field.
The conventional IP protection scheme utilizing the symmet-
ric encryption is depicted in Figure 5.2. The Host (PC) first en-
crypts the bitstream with a symmetric encryption algorithm
such as AES using a secret key before sending it to the FPGA.
Later, on the FPGA side, the bitstream is decrypted using the
same stored secret key and the corresponding decryption unit.
5.1.2 Proposed Novel Scheme
The proposed novel scheme is depicted in Figure 5.3. The con-
sidered FPGA supports the dynamic PR, and is divided into
static and dynamic logic regions. The initial bitfile (full bit-
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Figure 5.3: Novel Scheme for IP Protection
stream) to be loaded into the static part of the FPGA is an un-
encrypted design that does not feature any proprietary infor-
mation. It only contains the algorithm to generate the public-
private key pair and the interface between the host, FPGA, and
the ICAP. The individual steps of the scheme are illustrated in
Figure 5.4.
However, there are Flash-based FPGAs available in the market,
such as ProASIC3 device from Microsemi, over the SRAM based
FPGAs for key storage but the former are not in common use
yet. The proposed system works well when we consider an in-
house scenario i.e., the loading of the IP from a PC onto the FPGA
connected directly to it. But when the IP is to be loaded from a
remote location or over Internet then there is a possibility of an
attack on the system such as the MITM attack. In MITM attack,
an adversary tries to intercept the communication channel be-
tween the vendor and the user and he can deceive the system in
two possible ways. In one case, he can pose himself as the user
and send his own generated public key to the vendor for en-
cryption inorder to decrypt it later, with his private key, which
is the IP theft scenario. In the other case, he can pose himself
as the vendor to receive the public key from the user and send
back encrypted malicious configuration, which on after load-
ing on to the system would destroy the device. These two cases
clearly show that there is a lack of mutual authentication for
data origin in the system.
One solution to avoid the MITM attack is by providing an
additional, non-Internet based channel for transmission of the
public key from user to the vendor. The user may exploit the
Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) stick for
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a mobile phone link to the configuration files server of the ven-
dor. Thereby, only the vendor and the user would know the
public key being transmitted over the channel, which guaran-
tees the authenticity of the IP origin. However, there exist other
solutions available in the literature for thwarting the MITM at-
tack such as the MAC based schemes and signature schemes.
Following are the advantages of the proposed scheme:
• The public-private key pair may be regenerated at any
time. If a new configuration is downloaded from the host
it may be encrypted with a different public key and de-
crypted with the corresponding new private key. Even if
the FPGA is configured with the same partial bitfile at a
later instance, such as after a power-on-reset, a different
public/private key pair may be used.
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• There is no need of any non-volatile memory to store
the key (as for symmetric key in previously mentioned
scheme) for decrypting the bitfiles as the private key is
generated on the fly. In addition, the private key gener-
ated by the asymmetric algorithm running on the FPGA
is stored in the SRAM and if the FPGA loses power then
the private key no longer exists as the SRAM memory is
volatile.
• In general, the partial bitfile contains the vast majority of
the FPGA design with the logic in the static design consum-
ing a very small percentage of the overall FPGA resources.
Thus, most of the FPGA resources are allocated to the ac-
tual applications contained in the partial bitstreams.
• Even if at some point of time it is found that the asym-
metric algorithm being used is no more secure, one can
replace it with a new algorithm as it just requires loading
a new full bitstream into the static region of the FPGA.
• The issue of loading IPs from different vendors onto a
single SoC may be addressed.
There are also certain disadvantages with this scheme, such
as the implementation of asymmetric key algorithm (RSA) on
the FPGA consumes a lot of resources. However, this can be
avoided by replacing with efficient algorithms such as ECC. Al-
though the generation of partial and full bitstreams for the FPGA
is cost expensive, time expensive, and exhausting at the mo-
ment, the FPGA vendors claim that it will be much easier on top
of their newer versions of tools.
5.2 secure real-time systems
There is a continuous rise in the deployment of electronics in
today’s systems especially in automobiles, thus the task of se-
curing them against various attacks is becoming a major chal-
lenge. In particular, the most vulnerable points are: communi-
cation paths between the Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and
between Sensors & Actuators and the ECU, remote software up-
dates from the manufacturer and the in-field system. However,
when including additional mechanisms to secure such systems,
especially real-time systems, there will be a major impact on the
real-time properties, such as deadlines and schedulability, and
on the overall performance of the system. Thus to analyze the
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impact on the aforementioned properties, a minimal security
module is deployed in a target real-time system, while achiev-
ing the goals of secure communication and authentic system
update.
Real-time applications such as railway signaling control and
car-to-car communication are becoming increasingly important.
However, such systems require high quality of security to as-
sure the confidentiality and integrity of the information during
their operation. For example, in a railway signaling control sys-
tem, the control center must be provided with data about po-
sition and speed of the approaching train so that a command
specifying which track to follow may be sent back. In such a
case it must be assured that the messages exchanged between
the two parties are not intercepted and altered by a malicious
entity to avoid possible accidents. Additionally, it is mandatory
to confirm that the incoming data to the control center is in fact
from the approaching train and not from an adversary. Similar
requirements are needed in a car-to-car communication system.
Furthermore, above considered systems are highly safety rele-
vant, thus the real-time properties typically play an important
role in such systems. In general, the goal of a real-time system is
to satisfy its real-time properties, such as meeting deadlines, in
addition to guaranteeing functional correctness. This raises the
question, what will be the impact on these properties of such a
system when including, for example, security as an additional
feature?
There exist some work in literature which addresses the is-
sue of including security mechanisms inside real-time applica-
tions. For example, Lin et al. [62] have extended the real-time
schedulability algorithm Earliest Deadline First (EDF) with secu-
rity awareness features to achieve a static schedulability driven
security optimization in a real-time system. For this, they ex-
tended the EDF algorithm with a group-based security model to
optimize the combined security value of selected security ser-
vices while guaranteeing schedulability of the real-time tasks.
In a group-based security model, security services are parti-
tioned into several groups depending on the security type and
their individual quality so that a combination of both results in
a better quality of security. However, this approach had a major
challenge as how to define a quality value for a certain security
service and to compute the overhead due to those services. In
another work, authors Marko et al. have designed and imple-
mented a vehicular security module, which provides trusted
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computing like features in a car [99]. This security module pro-
tects the in-vehicle ECUs and the communication between them,
and is designed for a specific use in e-safety applications such
as emergency breaking and emergency call. Further, the au-
thors have given technical details about hardware design and
prototypical implementation of the security module in addi-
tion to comparing its performance with existing similar security
modules in the market. Additionally, the automotive industry
consortium, autosar, specified a service, referred to as Crypto
Service Manager (CSM), which provides a cryptographic func-
tionality in an automobile, based on a software library or hard-
ware module. Though this service is based on a software library,
it may be supported by cryptographic algorithms at the hard-
ware level for securing the applications executing on the appli-
cation layer. However, none of the aforementioned approaches
addresses the issue of analyzing the impact on the real-time
properties of a system when integrating a hardware security
module inside it. In the following, a description of the target
system under consideration is given before evaluating the im-
pact of including security features inside it.
5.2.1 Target System Specification
The system under consideration is depicted in Figure 5.5. It
comprises of a Sensor, an Actuator, an ECU with a processor &
a security module, and an update server. The system realizes a
simple real-time control application, where Sensor data are pro-
cessed by the control application in order to operate the plant
due to an Actuator. However, the concrete control application is
not of interest in this context. It might represent the engine con-
trol of a car, or a driver assistant system such as an Automatic
Breaking System (ABS).
The scenario depicted in Figure 5.5 consists of the following
flow: Sensor periodically delivers data from the plant over the
bus (1), which is in an encrypted form to avoid its interception
and cloning by an attacker. The data is received by the input
communication task ComIn, which is part of the operating sys-
tem (OS). Each time the input communication task receives a
packet, it calls the security service (SecSrv), which is also part
of the OS, for decryption of the packet (2). The security service
provides the hardware abstraction for security operations, and
schedules service calls. The decryption call from the commu-
nication task is forwarded to the security module (3), which
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Figure 5.5: Target System Scenario
processes the packet data. The cryptographic operations of the
security module modeled by Dec, Enc, and Auth are realized as
hardware blocks. The decrypted data is sent back to the secu-
rity service, which is in turn returned to the task ComIn. Now
the data is ready for transmission to the application (4), which
is modeled by a single task App. The application task is acti-
vated by the incoming packet, and processes the Sensor data.
The controller implementation of the task calculates respective
Actuator data and sends it to the communication task ComOut
(5) for transmission to the Actuator. However, before sending
the data to the Actuator, the communication task again calls the
security service (6), which in turn accesses the security module
for data encryption (7). After Enc has encrypted the data, it is
sent back to the communication task ComOut via SecSrv, which
delivers the packet to the Actuator (8). It is required that the
control application finishes the described flow within a single
control period, i.e., before the next Sensor data arrives. Addition-
ally, the system implements a function for software updates. To
update the system with new software, the UpdateServer sends
the data to the Upd task (a) via a communication medium (e.g.,
Internet) to the outside. This received data must be authentic-
ity verified and decrypted before loading it into the system. For
this, the task Upd forwards the data to the SecSrv, which utilizes
the Auth block of the security module (b). Only after a success-
ful authentication, the data is decrypted and loaded into the
system else it is rejected.
The security module, integrated into the ECU, is a hardware
module of the STPM (c.f. Section 3.5.2), comprising of crypto-
graphic hardware blocks for performing operations such as
encryption, decryption, and authenticity verification. Though
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these operations are denoted as tasks in the system view, they
are implemented as hardware blocks. Further, a controller (a
state machine), a memory block, and an I/O block are included
inside the security module (though not depicted in Figure 5.5).
Whereas the controller executes the commands for the afore-
mentioned cryptographic operations, the memory block acts as
a data buffer, and the I/O is an interface to the processor of the
ECU. The commands arrive as requests form the SecSrv on the
processor, and the responses from the security module are sent
back. In essence, the SecSrv acts as a software abstraction of
the hardware security module, for providing required crypto-
graphic operations to the executing tasks on the processor. The
security module is equipped with particular support for update
functionality i.e., authenticity verification. In normal operation,
the data is temporarily stored in the memory block of the secu-
rity module to compare the attached MAC value by the update
server with the computed MAC value in the security module
before decrypting and loading it. This kind of operation, where
all update data is stored in memory of the security module,
and authentication being applied at once on the data, is how-
ever not appropriate in the context of the considered real-time
application. This is because, while the security module is per-
forming authentication, other operations such as decryption of
incoming Sensor data or encryption of outgoing Actuator data
are blocked. Given this, large update data can block the device
for a long time span, resulting in a violation of allowed delay
by the control algorithm.
To avoid such a situation in the considered scenario, for au-
thenticity verification, the MAC is calculated in two steps. First
a checksum of the update data is calculated using a public hash
algorithm such as SHA-1 and then a MAC is computed on this
checksum. The Upd task thus calculates and sends only the
checksum of the data instead of whole data itself to the security
module via SecSrv. Considering the update process being not
time critical, Upd task is executed with low priority, prevent-
ing any undesired interference with the real-time application.
Therefore, only the interference for authentication of the single
checksum has to be considered. However, since the update data
being encrypted, Upd task needs to access the security module
for its decryption. To this end, the data is split into packets and
decrypted piece-wise though the impact of these operations has
to be considered in the real-time analysis.
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Another possibility to verify the authenticity of the update
data would be to compute the MAC iteratively within the se-
curity module. For this, the update data from the Upd task is
sent to the security module in a block-by-block basis via the Sec-
Srv. The computed HMAC on the received block is stored inside
the memory block of the security module. Before sending the
next block, the SecSrv checks for any pending requests for en-
cryption or decryption operation from other high priority tasks.
If there exist such a request, it is executed before sending the
next block of data for MAC computation. In order to handle this
procedure, the security module should be equipped with an
additional hardware block performing the scheduling of cryp-
tographic operations. Further, the communication interface be-
tween the SecSrv and the security module has to be modified.
Though, this method is currently not supported by current se-
curity module design, it is definitely a desired feature.
Though it is not depicted in Figure 5.5, the Sensor and the Ac-
tuator must also be equipped with the ability to perform encryp-
tion and decryption operations respectively. This is because, at
an higher level view of the system, the Sensor after obtaining
the data from the plant has to encrypt it before transmitting
it over the bus and the Actuator has to decrypt the received
data from the ECU before providing it to the plant. To perform
these operations they must also be equipped with the encryp-
tion and decryption blocks, along with the corresponding se-
cret key as in the security module. For this, an integrated non-
volatile memory may be utilized to store the secret key, which
is programmed into Sensor, security module, and Actuator by
system manufacturer during the system deployment. Addition-
ally, the security module must hold an additional secret key for
performing authentication operation on the update data. The
features of the security module here are identical to the ones
in hardware module of the update algorithm (c.f. Section 3.5.2)
i.e., the former utilizes the same cryptographic blocks as the
latter. Thus, the security module provides a secure communica-
tion path between the Sensor and the Actuator and to provide
authentic updates of the system. Additionally it consumes very
few computational resources, which is essential in resource con-
strained embedded systems.
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Figure 5.6: Considered Adversarial Model
5.2.2 Adversarial Model
To describe all possible attack points in the considered system,
an adversarial model is formulated as depicted in Figure 5.6.
The model highlights all the components (with a simplified
ECU block) and the corresponding internal and external com-
munication paths (i.e., numbered circles) of the original system
(c.f. Figure 5.5). The adversary considered in the model is an
active eavesdropper (c.f. Dolev-Yao Model [34]) and is able to
perform attacks as described in taxonomy of cryptographic at-
tacks by Popp in [75]. For an analysis here, it assumed that
the attacker is only able to perform classical cryptanalytic at-
tacks on the external communication links (indicated by thick
arrows coming from adversary) i.e., from Sensor to ECU, ECU
to Actuator, and update server to ECU. The details of classical
cryptanalytic attacks and techniques to overcome them are al-
ready given in Section 3.3. With reference to this, the security
module of the target system is embedded with cryptographic
blocks providing such techniques. We rule out the possibility
of attacker being eavesdropping the ECU’s internal communi-
cation (indicated by a dotted arrow coming from adversary)
because such an attack implies that the attacker is having a
physical access to the ECU and thus control the running OS and
the tasks themselves. Further, we do not consider any Denial-of-
Service (DoS) attacks by the attacker on any of the components
of the considered system.
5.2.3 System Analysis
To analyze the impact of including the security module on the
real-time properties of the system, we consider three different
test cases as detailed in the sequel. A brief description about
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the system set-up and the utilized tools is given before delving
into the obtained results with the test cases.
The control application is executed with a frequency of 10
kHz, i.e., the Sensor sends each 100 us a data packet to the
ECU. The update service is modeled as a sporadic application
with typically very large time spans between individual invoca-
tions. All tasks of the processor are scheduled by a fixed prior-
ity scheduling scheme with preemption, where lower priority
tasks can be interrupted by higher priority tasks. Furthermore,
all tasks belonging to the OS (depicted by a dark gray shaded
area of Figure 5.5) get higher priority than the application tasks.
The priorities in descending order are ComIn, ComOut, SecSrv,
App, and Upd. The operations of the security module are not
scheduled, and the module can be considered as a shared re-
source. The SecSrv task processes incoming security operation
requests for the security module in First-In-First-Out (FIFO) or-
der.
For all test cases, the processor of the ECU is a 50 MHz pro-
cessor (20 ns cycle time) that is equipped with internal memory
for storing data and code. Internal memory is accessed by read-
ing and writing 16 bit words within a single processor cycle.
Communication between the ECU, the Sensor, and the Actuator
is realized by a Controller Area Network (CAN) bus. For sim-
plicity, it is assumed that all data are transferred between the
processor and the CAN bus interface via I/O registers of 16 bit
width, and with a delay of four processor cycles. Communica-
tion over CAN is restricted to 64 bit user data, and is assumed
that this is also the size of packets transmitted between the ECU
and the Sensor/Actuator. In order to transmit 128 bit data as re-
quired by the operation of the security module, each transmis-
sion consists of two packets. Receiving and transmitting data
thus requires 16 Byte data transfer between the CAN bus con-
troller and the processor, summing up to 64 processor cycles
(1.28 us). Storing the packet into the OS internal memory costs
additional 320 ns. Bus latencies are not further specified in this
setting, as the concentration is mainly on the timing of the ECU
application.
The utilized AES algorithm inside the security module oper-
ates on 128 bit blocks of input data at a time. Thus, all the
blocks (enc, dec, and Auth) of the security module, operate on
same data size because they utilize the same algorithm. The
security module is implemented as a proof-of-concept on a Xil-
inx Virtex-5 FPGA [108] platform. The individual cryptographic
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Figure 5.7: Scenario 1 w/o security feature
blocks of the security module are simulated and synthesized
utilizing the device specific tools. Utilizing an operating fre-
quency of 358MHz for the FPGA, the execution time for each of
encryption, decryption, and authentication operations is deter-
mined (by simulation) to be 46 ns for a 128 bit block of input
data. The timing parameters for other operating frequencies of
the security module are obtained by simple scaling. The uti-
lized FPGA device supports storage in the form of BRAM with
36 kb size, which is large enough to be used as memory block
of the security module.
The timing analysis is applied in order to find the worst-case
end-to-end response time of the control application, starting
from the reception of Sensor data up to the sending of Actuator
data (as depicted in Figure 5.7). Various static scheduling anal-
ysis tools are available for this analysis (e.g., [50]). The system
however is sufficiently small for a more precise analysis based
on real-time model-checking [32]. To this end, the system is
translated into a Uppaal model [18]. The worst-case response
time is obtained by a binary search on the value range of re-
spective model variable.
5.2.3.1 Target system without any security features
In the first scenario, which is depicted in Figure 5.7, the com-
munication tasks send the data directly to the control appli-
cation and to the communication bus without encryption or
decryption. The resulting end-to-end response time is shown
in column ”Scenario 1" of Table 5.1. As expected, the analysis
shows that the execution times are simply summed up for the
involved tasks since no further interferences occur in this sim-
ple setting. Indeed the situation would be different when mul-
tiple application tasks are executed on the same ECU, which
would cause additional interferences.
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Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
50MHz 50MHz 50MHz 358MHz
Task LPC LPC MMIO MMIO
App 50.0 us 50.0 us 50.0 us 50.0 us 50.0 us
ComIn 1.6 us 1.6 us 1.6 us 1.6 us 1.6 us
ComOut 1.6 us 1.6 us 1.6 us 1.6 us 1.6 us
SecSrv — 80 ns 80 ns 80 ns 80 ns
Comm. CPU/SM — 1.46 us 1.46 us 400 ns 200 ns
Dec — 358 ns 358 ns 358 ns 46 ns
Enc — 358 ns 358 ns 358 ns 46 ns
Auth — — 358 ns 358 ns 46 ns
Response Time 53.2 us 60.1 us 62.0 us 56.7 us 54.96 us
Table 5.1: Analysis Results
5.2.3.2 Target system with secure communication feature
In the second scenario, only the secure communication feature
between the ECU and the Sensor and the Actuator is enabled but
the update service is switched off. This implies that the security
module has to perform only encryption and decryption but no
authentication. For this scenario, we assume that the security
module communicates with the processor via the LPC bus [51].
According to the specification [51], the transfer of 128 bit data
plus 16 bit command requires about 1.46 us, when the bus
operates with typical timing parameters. Each invocation of the
SecSrv involves a transfer of the data to or from the security
module, plus the execution time of the task of 80 ns for internal
copying operations. The security module operating at a clock
rate of 50MHz results in an individual execution time of 358 ns
for encryption and decryption (from simulation results). With
this set-up, the timing analysis shows (column ”Scenario 2" of
Table 5.1), that enabling only the secure communication feature
results in a significant raise in the response time of the system
i.e., about 13% more than in the previous scenario.
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5.2.3.3 Target system with secure communication and secure update
features
For the third scenario, both secure communication and authen-
tic update features are enabled. This scenario has been ana-
lyzed with three different sets of timing parameters.
The first setting assumes the same parameters as for ”Sce-
nario 2". Hence the security module operates at a clock rate of
50 MHz, and communicates with the processor via LPC bus.
The results show a further raise in the end-to-end response
time of the application because the update service might call
the authentication service, which incurs an additional execu-
tion time to the pending encryption and decryption operations
of the security module. Thus, it can be seen that the end-to-end
response time is around 16% higher than in the first scenario.
For the second setting, it is assumed that the security module
communicates with the processor via MMIO. Memory transfers
are assumed to operate with 16 bit words, and a delay of four
processor cycles, resulting in transfer times of 80 ns. A trans-
fer between the processor and the security module now sums
up to 400 ns. The final setting works with a very fast security
module, and memory transfers only having two cycles delay.
The security module operates at 358 MHz, which results in all
cryptographic operations with 46 ns of execution time. Surpris-
ingly, the end-to-end response time in the second and the final
setting has reduced and is only around 6.5% and 3.5% respec-
tively. This implies that the type of communication interface be-
tween the processor and the security module has a significant
impact on the resulting overall response time of the system.
In all settings, the software update function is assumed to
perform the operations as discussed in Section 5.2.1. After cal-
culating the checksum of the update data, task Upd sends an
authentication request to SecSrv. When the authentication is
successful (which is always true in the considered scenario),
the task successively sends decryption requests for each packet
of the update data, while waiting for the reply before sending
a new request. The results shown in Table 5.1 represent the
worst-case behavior obtained with various values of the execu-
tion time (between 10 ns and 1 us) needed by Upd between suc-
cessive decryption requests. The impact of the operation of Upd
remains rather small, which can be explained by the fact that
the task is executed with low priority. However, the selection
of the execution times is not exhaustive, and thus do not guar-
antee absence of race conditions. To enforce limited impact of
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the update function, the SecSrv should be modified by running
with priority inheritance, where requests are executed with the
same priority as the calling task.
To summarize, it is observed that, with the integration of
such a security module into the ECU, the response time of the
system is strictly dependent on the utilized communication in-
terface between the ECU processor and the security module. In
specific, the worst-case response time of the system is high for a
slower interface (i.e., LPC) and decreases drastically for a faster
interface (i.e., MMIO). Thus, when including a security mecha-
nism in real-time systems it is necessary to consider about the
type of communication interface being utilized.
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6
C O N C L U S I O N
The audit of the trust units should be used reliably feasible for
users. Today’s trust anchors, however, are not in a suitable posi-
tion to guarantee the system integrity in amended new require-
ments. In this context, an innovative reconfiguration concept
allows the adjustment of existing trust anchors, for example
for re-establishment of integrity even after a compromise of se-
curity algorithms and for providing future-proof customized
functionality. The unique feature of this concept is the ability
to securely exchange encryption algorithms without modifying
the architecture of the trust anchor. This is achieved by the re-
configurability concept and thus avoiding the replacement of
complete component itself. The details about such a concept
and the resulting design utilizing it, which form the main goal
of this work, are summarized below.
A novel architectural concept for updating the cryptographic
engines embedded in a TPM is proposed and implemented in
this thesis. First, the state-of-the-art technology, i.e., the TC ap-
proach and the TPM security functionalities are detailed. Then,
a thorough analysis of the possible threats to the cryptographic
engines on the TPM and the implications of these threats on
its security functions is performed. From this analysis, an in-
vestigation is performed to determine the functional and non-
functional requirements that arise due to compromised cryp-
tographic engines, in specific RSA and SHA-1, on the TPM. This
analysis, referred to as STC, led to defining the architectural re-
quirements of the new updatable TPM design that supports a
flexible and secure update of the compromised engines. Uti-
lizing the STC concept, a novel architecture called STPM with
required features is proposed.
The STPM architecture comprises of all the required compo-
nents such as the execution engine, update algorithm, configu-
ration port, memories, and a region for updatable cryptographic
engines to provide the features of a conventional TPM. The ex-
ecution engine is a microcontroller based system, which exe-
cutes the commands arriving from the processor of the system
utilizing the running command software on it. The update algo-
rithm, a hardware module, utilizes a special format for update
123
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data for securely updating the cryptographic engines. In addi-
tion to providing an updatability feature, the STPM stays secure
against the possible attacks, which were formulated utilizing
an adversarial model. Furthermore, the STPM re-establishes the
trust after an engine update which is a mandatory requirement
in trustworthy systems. A proof-of-concept implementation of
the STPM architecture utilizing available components in the mar-
ket, in specific, on the Xilinx Virtex-5 LX110T FPGA platform is
detailed. On this implemented architecture two test cases for
updating the fundamental engines SHA-1 and RSA are also pre-
sented. Two real-world scenarios that may utilize the features
of the STPM are illustrated as a part of the applications.
Given that the proposed STC concept is generic, it is upto the
manufacturer to decide on the architectural view but it must be
guaranteed that all the requirements of the proposed concept
are met. Though, software-based solutions are also possible in
principle, but the complexity of the cryptographic computation
method results in long computation times on the processors,
which is not desired. More powerful processors are often not an
option, since both the total cost of a system and the energy de-
mand would rise unduly. Further, the utilized platform i.e., the
Virtex-5 FPGA, for a proof-of-concept implementation in here,
is not only large in size but also expensive, thus it is upto the
vendor or manufacturer to choose an economical board/chip
for the STPM design. Therefore, a trusted reconfiguration is the
indispensable prerequisite for the realization of reconfigurable
trust anchors that allow for sustainable use.
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